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Chapter 1
Introduction
The components, the magnitude and the allocation of civil litigation costs
play a crucial role in the overall litigation process dynamics. First of all,
litigation costs, and in particular the way in which they are allocated
between litigants, aﬀect parties’ strategies in litigation1. In fact, when
deciding on how much to invest in litigation, parties must consider who
will ultimately bear such costs. The financial risk of litigation can result
in excessive and aggressive investments increasing the total costs of liti-
gation and the duration of trials. Second, litigation costs may aﬀect the
Plaintiﬀ’s decision on whether to bring a case to court or not and the lit-
igants’ subsequent choice between settlement and litigation2. In fact, the
burden of litigation costs can undermine the Plaintiﬀ’s access to justice,
1This is according to the standard theory of litigation developed by Landes (1971), Posner (1973a), and Gould
(1973) where litigating parties are rational actors who seek to maximize their returns from the litigation process by
investing resources in the process.
2Shavell (1981), was the first to extend the work of Landes (1971) and Gould (1973) on the incentives to sue and
to consider the settlement option.
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the Defendant’s choice to defend and the litigants’ power in bargaining a
favourable settlement. The presence of cost barriers can exclude meritori-
ous cases from justice. This can impact on legal compliance by increasing
the people’s incentive to deviate from existing legal rules and by mak-
ing private enforcement more likely3. Finally, litigants’ incentives and
behaviour can be aﬀected by the presence of instruments for financing
civil litigation aimed at distributing the financial risk of civil litigation
among larger groups of individuals like legal expenses insurances, mass
litigations and public legal aid4.
In sum, litigation costs and how they are allocated impact on the
overall legal system eﬃciency. Indeed, the more a legal system keeps the
social welfare loss of the discussed dynamics minimal the more a legal
system is eﬃcient. However, such dynamics cannot be considered sep-
arately and are interdependently connected. Taken individually, higher
costs of litigation represent a waste of resources; they increase the dissi-
pation of the case value hence increasing the welfare loss5. However, due
to higher litigation costs litigants may be less willing to litigate and this
decreases the litigation rate6 or at least discourages the weakest cases
from going to court, which would help courts focusing on more merito-
3For papers on fee-shifting and legal compliance see Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld (1987) and Hylton (1993).
4For instance see Barendrecht et al. (2014).
5See Luppi and Parisi (2012).
6See Massenot et al. (2016) and Luppi and Parisi (2012).
9rious cases7. A lower litigation rate can make the system more eﬃcient
and lowers the duration of trials. Focusing on meritorious cases, instead,
increases the probability of creating "new" precedents and this reduces
legal uncertainty8 and reduces litigation rate in the long term9. This re-
sults in a trade-oﬀ between litigation costs and litigation rate that will be
further discussed in the thesis both from a qualitative and quantitative
prospective.
The economic literature regarding the eﬀects of legal costs and of how
they are allocated on the aforementioned variety of decisions (before and
during the litigation process) is extensive and is still developing thanks to
the contribution of several Law and Economics scholars. In particular,
Katz and Sanchirico (2010) survey the literature on fee-shifting where
"fee-shifting" refers to the main legal rules for allocating the costs of
litigation between a Plaintiﬀ and a Defendant. Despite the large number
of contributions on the topic, there remain several open questions and
diﬀerent issues that warrant further investigation. Most importantly,
the literature mainly focuses on two allocation costs rules; the American
Rule, providing that a party always pays her own fees (independently
of the litigation outcome) and the English Rule, according to which the
7See Massenot et al. (2016) and Carbonara et al. (2015).
8See "The use of cost litigation rules to improve the eﬃciency", submission to the Australian Law Reform Com-
mission review of the litigation cost rules.
9This is exacerbated in common law systems.
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loser in a lawsuit is required to bear at least part of the winner’s legal
expenses. However, there also exists a third type of rule, the One-Way
fee-shifting Rule, where fees are shifted in favour of only one party. Under
this rule, one party recovers her litigation costs in the event of litigation
(the advantaged party) whereas the other party (the disadvantaged one)
is not allowed to do so. If the Plaintiﬀ is the advantaged party the rule is
known as the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule; if the Defendant is the advantaged
party the rule is instead known as the Favouring Defendant Rule.
The general aim of this thesis is to use and refine traditional models
of civil litigation in the attempt to describe the features of the One-way
fee-shifting Rule and its eﬀects on the litigation process.
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 (this chapter)
presents an introduction to the topic and lays out the structure of the
work. Chapter 2 provides a general framework of the topic of litiga-
tion costs as a preparation to better understand the remaining chapters.
Chapter 3 proposes a theoretical framework which takes into account all
of the characteristics and peculiarities of the One-way fee-shifting Rule;
this chapter oﬀers an explanation on the eﬀects of the rule on the litiga-
tion process and illustrates a comparison with the more common English
Rule. Chapter 4 adopts numerical solutions in order to serve as an exam-
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ple for the model presented in the previous chapter and to extend results.
Chapter 5 shows how the One-way fee-shifting Rule could be used as a
policy instrument, making a case for the adoption of such tool in actual
legal systems; the chapter investigates whether in Europe the Favouring
Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule can be an alternative to legal aid for assisting
wealth-constrained Plaintiﬀs in pursuing cases that would otherwise be
dropped. Finally, Chapter 6 lays out the general conclusion of the thesis
and provides insights for future reasearch..
In order to provide the reader with a general view on the research
project, Section 1.1 oﬀers a an overview on the One-way fee-shifting Rule
existing literature laying the foundation for the thesis research questions
that are discussed and motivated in Section 1.2.
1.1 The One-way fee-shifting Rule: Related
literature
The following literature overview aims at showing how the Law and Eco-
nomics contribution on the analysis of the One-way fee-shifting Rule is
still lacking leaving the door open for new theoretical and empirical re-
search. As a general remark, the beginning of each chapter includes a
more precise and specific discussion on the literature relevant for the
12 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
chapter itself.
As it will be later discussed, from a quantitative theoretical prospect
the Law and Economic literature has modeled litigation as a rent-seeking
scenario where parties (litigants) expend resources (mainly investments
in attorneys’ fees) to increase the probability of winning a case10. In this
setting it is possible to show how litigants’ resources are aﬀected by diﬀer-
ent fee-shifting rules and how this impacts on others litigation dynamics
(e.g. the incentive to sue, the settlement stage, and the legal compliance).
While a variety of scholars applied rent-seeking models focusing only
on the English Rule and on the American Rule11, the only rent-seeking
contribution on the One-way fee-shifting Rule has been developed by
Braeutigam et al. (1984) and extended by Hylton (1993). Among other
things, Braeutigam et al. (1984) oﬀered a theoretical attempt to cap-
ture the eﬀect on total legal expenditures and on the minimum level of
merit of cases that plaintiﬀs will be induced to bring by moving from the
American Rule to the One-way fee-shifting Rule (without considering the
possibility of settlement). The change leads to an increase in total legal
expenditures. However, the eﬀect on the minimum merit of the case and
10For fee-shifting rent-seeking analysis see for instance Braeutigam et al. (1984), Katz (1988) and Farmer and
Pecorino (1999).
11In this regards, the main contributors are Katz (1988), Hause (1989), Farmer and Pecorino (1999), Hirshleifer
and Osborne (2001), Baye et al. (2000) and Luppi and Parisi (2012).
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hence on the litigation rate is ambiguous. Hylton (1993) included into
the analysis the eﬀect of diﬀerent fee-shifting rules on legal compliance.
It was shown how a One-way pro-Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule maximises
legal compliance compared to the American Rule.
Shavell (1981) set a simple game-theoretic model to analyse and com-
pare the eﬀects of diﬀerent fee-shifting rules on the settlement rate. The
model is based on the hypothesis that rational individuals may end up
in litigation (as opposed to settling) because of possible diﬀerences in
their expectations about the relative probability of winning the case.
The author concluded that the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule always provides
the highest settlement rate because it adds more credibility to Plaintiﬀs’
cases than the English Rule. Wagener (2003) extended Shavell (1981)
analysis to antitrust litigation. The author suggested that granting suc-
cessful antitrust plaintiﬀs an award of their attorneys’ fees (One-way
fee-shifting Rule) may result in a structure under which an opportunistic
Plaintiﬀ can extract sizeable settlement far greater than the expected
award at verdict, regardless of the strength of the Plaintiﬀ’s antitrust
claim. Therefore, this may cause abuses in antitrust litigation and an
increasing number of nuisance litigation. The author concluded argu-
ing that mandatory One-way fee-shifting in private antitrust litigation
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(15 U.S.C. ) should be then discarded; judges should determine whether
to apply the rule or not according to several factors (relative financial
strengths of the litigants, the egregiousness of the Defendant’s conduct,
the novelty of the Plaintiﬀ’s claim).
From a qualitative perspective, Krent (1993) developed an analysis on
the US debate over the One-way attorney fee-shifting statute with a fo-
cus on cases involving private litigants suing federal state or governments.
The author concluded that the One-way fee-shifting Rule 1) may lead to
more eﬀective governance by incentivising small parties and public inter-
est group to contrast government overreaching and forcing government
agencies to take into account more fully the costs of their action 2) may
encourage firms to comply with federal regulation. However, in many
contexts, One-way fee-shifting is not needed and in others is quite inef-
ficient (public loss). The author suggests that the rule is probably more
eﬃcient where there is no significant monetary stake (this to minimise
the self interested behaviour of the private bar and watchdog groups) and
when parties are somehow sensitive to litigation costs.
The theoretical literature on the One-way fee-shifting Rule has several
shortcomings. First, the model by Braeutigam et al. (1984) rather than
focusing on the intrinsic characteristics of the One-way fee-shifting Rule
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(i.e. how the rule directly aﬀects the litigants behaviours and the proba-
bility of winning at trial) only focuses on the eﬀects of moving from the
American Rule to the One-way fee-shifting Rule on legal expenditures
and on the litigation rate. The model is pretty basic, it does not dis-
cuss the functional form for the probability of winning at trial and does
not allow litigants to face diﬀerent returns from investing in litigation12.
Second, the eﬀects of moving from the English Rule to the One-way fee-
shifting Rule are not treated by the authors. The lack of a comparison
between the English Rule and the One-way fee-shifting Rule does not
provide theoretical support for possible policies aimed at introducing the
One-way fee-shifting Rule in a legal system where the default rule is the
Loser-pays Rule. Indeed no scholars have discussed about the issue.
Furthermore, despite the analysis on the settlement stage oﬀered by
Shavell (1981) is general, no scholars have considered the One-way fee
shifting Rule as a possible instrument for favouring wealth-constrained
Plaintiﬀ’s access to justice. The paper by Wagener (2003) is case and
country specific (it only considers private antitrust litigation in the US)
and again it does not account for comparisons between the English Rule
and the One-way fee-shifting Rule.
12These aspects are instead considered in several paper analysing the English Rule and the American Rule. See for
instance Katz (1988), Farmer and Pecorino (1999), Luppi and Parisi (2012) and Carbonara et al. (2015).
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Finally, the literature does not include any analysis on the Partial One-
way fee-shifting Rule where the successful favoured litigant can recover
only a fraction of her litigation costs.
The absence of a solid and extensive theoretical analysis on the One-
way fee-shifting Rule has also narrowed the empirical analysis on the
topic. Indeed the main empirical and experimental papers on fee-shifting
rules do not account for the One-Way fee-shifting Rule13. Particular
cases where the One-way fee-shifting Rule is adopted have been studied
by Eisenberg et al. (2014) and Eisenberg and Miller (2013). In particular,
Eisenberg et al. (2014) empirically analyzed fee awards in Israel, where
Judges have discretion to award fees, with the English Rule operating as
a default . Using a dataset of 2641 Israeli cases terminated by judgment
in district courts in 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2012 the authors concluded
that in tort cases won by individuals against corporate defendants, corpo-
rations paid their own fees plus Plaintiﬀs’ fees in 99 percent of the cases
(One-way fee-shifting Rule pro Plaintiﬀ). This is because corporation on
average have a higher ability to pay than individuals; therefore, Judges
use the One-way fee-shifting Rule to protect more individuals. Eisenberg
and Miller (2013) extended the empirical research on fee-shifting by em-
pirically studying fee clauses in 2,347 US contracts in large corporations’
13See Coursey and Stanley (1988), Coughlan and Plott (1997) and Hughes and Snyder (1995).
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public securities filings. As a matter of fact, contracting parties have
the possibility to opt out of the default American Rule on fee-shifting.
The authors showed indeed that 37 percent of the contracts specified the
English Rule while 17,2 percent of contracts specified the One-way fee-
shifting Rule. This suggests that the American Rule may not be optimal
in many commercial contracts since parties usually reject it.
However, these interesting findings are based on qualitative hypotheses
and lack a solid theoretical basis.
1.2 Research Questions and Motivations
First of all, the mechanisms and the dynamics through which litigation
costs impact on the litigation process can not be fully understood without
a clear, detailed and complete view of the components, the allocation
and the financing of such costs. This is why Chapter 2 provides a general
legal analysis of litigation costs. How are litigation costs defined? How
are litigation costs allocated between parties in diﬀerent countries? Are
there mechanisms for financing those costs? The chapter answers the
aforementioned questions through a positive analysis and providing an
intuitive case study.
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Chapter 3 investigates the eﬀects of diﬀerent litigation rules on the
litigants’ incentives to spend resources in litigated civil cases and on
litigants’ probability of winning at trial. Since the pioneering work of
Landes (1971) and Posner (1973b), the Law and Economics literature
has modeled litigants as rational agents who maximise their utilities in
terms of return from litigation. The choice variables are investment in
lawyers’ fees, costs for evidence taking and experts’ fees. Assuming that
each litigant takes the other’s decision as given, litigants reach a Nash
equilibrium which depends on several factors such as the stake at trial,
the marginal costs of legal resources and the sensitivity of trial outcomes
to the parties’ individual eﬀorts. Those situations where parties spend
resources to improve their share of (or probability of winning) a fixed
stake, are known in Economic literature as rent-seeking (Tullock (1967)).
As shown in the literature overview, no exhaustive rent seeking analysis
can be found in the area of the One-way fee-shifting Rule. Hence, Chapter
3 aims at contributing to the existing literature by refining the existing
models of litigation choices in order to account for the One-way fee-
shifting Rule. This leads to the main research questions of the research
project:
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1) What are the eﬀects of the One-way fee-shifting Rule on litigants’
behaviour and decisions? Is the rule eﬀective at discouraging (encour-
aging) the disadvantaged (favoured) litigant? How does the One-way
fee-shifting Rule compare with other rules and mainly with the English
Rule?
The Chapter 3 analysis indeed shows that the One-Way fee-shifting Rule
provides incentives to the favoured litigant to exert more eﬀort than the
disadvantaged one. This increases the favoured litigant’s probability of
winning at trial, decreasing the winning probability for the disadvantaged
litigant; the One-Way fee-shifting Rule is the only Rule that allows the
policymaker to influence the litigation process in favour of one of the
two parties. The chapter provides answers to another set of research
questions:
2) What are the the implications for the legal system’s eﬃciency of mov-
ing from the English Rule to the One-Way fee-shifting Rule?
Despite the fact that the model does not consider the litigants’ possibility
of settling the case (no exit option is available) it is shown how such a
movement14 has an ambiguous eﬀect on litigants’ total legal expenditure
14The chapter aims to provide policies advise for European countries. This is why the model does not consider
the American Rule. However, for the purpose of completeness the Appendix includes a Section accounting for the
American Rule as well.
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and on the litigation rate as well15. As a matter of fact while the shift
always decreases the disadvantaged litigant legal expenditure, the eﬀect
on the advantaged litigant expenditure is not predictable and depends on
how the disadvantaged litigant reacts to her opponent legal expenditures
choice. The litigation rate decreases if total litigation costs increase and
vice-versa (trade oﬀ); therefore there is ambiguity on such factor as well
when shifting from the English rule to the One-Way fee-shifting Finally,
the chapter provides insights to answer the following research question:
3) How and where can the One-Way fee-shifting Rule be applied as an
instrument for policy?
Following the results, several examples where the One-Way fee-shifting
rule could be indeed used as an eﬀective policy instrument for making
legal system more eﬃcient or more equal are provided.
Chapter 4 extends the previous chapter analysis by means of numerical
evaluations as the complexity of the model does not allow for closed
solutions16. The main focus is on the second set of research questions.
By assuming a specific form of the probability of winning at trial, it is
shown how, when moving from the English Rule to the One-Way fee-
15This chapter considers total legal costs and litigation rate as the main proxies for the legal system eﬃciency.
16In mathematics, an expression is said to be a closed-form expression if it can be expressed analytically in terms
of a finite number of certain "well-known" functions.
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shifting Rule, total litigation costs always decrease while the litigation
rate increases.
Chapter 5 presents a diﬀerent approach to study the issue by using
a general settlement model where legal expenditures are taken as given.
The aim is to understand how litigants behaviour, before going to court,
is aﬀected by the use of the One-Way fee-shifting Rule. More precisely,
it is shown how a Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule could be used as an instru-
ment for assisting wealth-constrained Plaintiﬀs in pursuing cases that
would otherwise be dropped; and in particular how, in this respect, the
rule could be a valid alternative to legal aid. The chapter answers the
following research questions:
4) How do the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule and legal aid diﬀerently aﬀect the
Plaintiﬀ’s credibility and incentive to sue, the litigation/settlement rate
and the settlement amount? How do the two instruments compare with
the English Rule?
5) Can the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule be an alternative tool to
legal aid for assisting wealth-constrained Plaintiﬀs in pursuing cases that
would otherwise be dropped?
First, the result achieved in the previous chapter is confirmed: with re-
spect to the English Rule, the favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule increases the num-
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ber of cases that the Plaintiﬀ brings to justice. In fact, the rule increases
the Plaintiﬀ’s credibility to sue and her willingness to go to court even
if cost barriers are present. However, this result mainly reflects on the
settlement stage (which is not considered in Chapter 3). More precisely,
all of the new credible cases that are brought to court by the Plaintiﬀ
and some of the cases that would be litigated under the English Rule are
settled before the trial. This suggests that the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule
increases the settlement rate and the settlement amount; however it de-
creases the litigation rate. Second, it is shown that a similar result can
be achieved with the use of legal aid; however legal aid always increases
the litigation rate and public expenditure. Therefore, the chapter sug-
gests that the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule can be a valid alternative to legal
aid for assisting wealth constrained Plaintiﬀs in bringing to justice cases
that would have otherwise been dropped and, under certain conditions
it might also be more eﬀective than legal aid.
Chapter 6 presents a final discussion on the results achieved in the
previous chapters; further, it shows how such results can be discussed in
the same framework.
In sum, this thesis contributes to the literature by developing a solid
theoretical analysis of the intrinsic characteristics of One-way fee-shifting
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Rule. First, the analysis permits to compare the rule with the more com-
monly used English Rule in terms of litigants’ behaviour, total litigation
costs and litigation rate. Second, the analysis shows how the One-way
fee-shifting Rule can be used as a policy instrument and more precisely
as an alternative to legal aid for assisting wealth constrained Plaintiﬀs in
bringing to justice cases that would have otherwise been dropped. Future
research can build on this framework to empirically test the model impli-
cation and to enlarge the qualitative debate on the One-way fee-shifting
Rules.
24 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
Civil Litigation Costs: A Legal
Analysis
2.1 Introduction
The mechanisms and the dynamics through which litigation costs impact
on the litigation process can not be fully understood without a clear,
detailed and complete view on the components, the allocation and the
financing of litigation costs. This is why this chapter provides a general
legal analysis of litigation costs. This Chapter is organised as follows.
Section 2.2 describes what are the main components of litigation costs
and their relative magnitude. Section 2.3 provides a detailed analysis and
description of the rules governing the allocation of legal expenses among
litigants. Section 2.4 describes the existing mechanisms for financing civil
25
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litigation and how each instrument works. Each of the aforementioned
sections provides a general view of the analysed topic and briefly de-
scribes how diﬀerent developed world’s jurisdictions fit into the analysis.
Section 2.5 concludes with a case study: following the analysis of the
previous sections, it is shown how litigation costs, their allocation and
their financing work in Italy.
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2.2 The definition of litigation costs
Litigation costs can be divided in three main classes: attorneys’ fees,
court costs and costs for evidence taking. These classes are individually
analysed in Subsections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 respectively. The analy-
sis is mostly based on the two most important comparative studies on
litigation costs and fee allocation present in the literature. First, the
book by Hodges, Vogenauer and Tulibacka which contains the first ma-
jor comparative study (more than 30 jurisdictions) of litigation costs and
methods of funding litigation (see Hodges et al. (2010)). Second, the
book edited by Mathias Reiman including 40 national reports commis-
sioned by the International Academy of Comparative Law (see Reimann
(2012)) that extends the first contribution by increasing the number of
national reports and by oﬀering a more detailed analysis. The national
reports provided by the aforementioned books cover a substantial portion
of the world legal system, including both Civil Law and Common Law
countries. In almost every country the distinction between attorneys’
fees and court costs is conspicuous; Subsection 2.2.3 shows instead that,
depending on the type of legal system, costs for evidence taking can be
considered as court costs or attorney’s fees. However, for the stake of
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completeness, costs for evidence taking are individually considered.
2.2.1 Attorneys’ fees
Attorneys’ fees represent the compensation the client has to pay to his
or her lawyers for legal services performed by the latter on the client’s
behalf. While most jurisdictions leave the determination of attorneys’
fees to the market, others tend to regulate attorneys’ fees to various
extents. When fees are not regulated, lawyers either fix an hourly rate,
charging for each hour they work on the client’s behalf, or, for simple
or routine cases, set a flat fee. Moreover, some jurisdictions usually
allow for success oriented fees; for instance, by contingency/conditional
fees the lawyer is paid by a predefined judgment-share/premium only in
the event of victory. Fees are usually determined according to the case
complexity (size and type), the lawyers reputation, the location where
the case is filed and the clients resources. When instead attorneys’ fees
are regulated, they can be set by oﬃcial schedules that are tied to the
litigated amount or to the court in which the case is litigated; these
schedules provide either an absolute amount or a maximum-minimum
range and can be bindingly exclusive or not. Moreover, success oriented
fees can be prohibited or limited. Attorneys’ fees typically represent the
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largest share of litigation costs1; this is especially true for Common Law
countries. In fact, common law jurisdictions are characterised by the so-
called adversarial procedural system. While in a typical civil law trial
the judge dominates the scene by deciding on the basis of his or her
internal conviction, in a typical common law trial the parties, through
their lawyers, directly control the process by organising the case and
by developing the fact with their sole initiative. Therefore, common law
systems are characterised by higher lawyers’ eﬀorts and by a more passive
role of the court, consequently attorneys fees have a higher impact on
total litigation costs than in civil law countries2.
2.2.2 Court costs
Court costs are given by expenses the court has to support when a case is
filed and litigated. First of all, almost every jurisdiction charges a filing
fee on litigants for the use of the state’s court. The filing fee can be a
unique amount that has to be payed by parties at the beginning of the
case or a series of subsequent payments (one for each step that the case
reaches). Moreover, the size of the fee can be either fixed, or related to the
amount in dispute (many jurisdictions cap court costs so as not to give
rise of astronomical fees for very large cases). Others minor court costs
1This is confirmed by the national reports in Hodges et al. (2010) and Reimann (2012).
2See Luppi and Parisi (2012).
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are represented by court transcripts, charges for depositions, printing
documents and payment for witnesses appointed by the court; these costs
are usually charged on litigants at the end of the trial. Although court
costs are usually lower than attorneys’ fees, they can reach relatively
high values. This is especially true for civil law jurisdictions where, given
the inquisitorial system, courts play an active and central role, and thus
require higher costs; these costs are usually shifted to litigants.
2.2.3 Costs for evidence taking
Costs for evidence taking are minor costs that are not directly intended
for financing the state court system or for paying for lawyers’ work. These
costs mostly consist of compensation to witnesses and experts. While in
most civil law countries witnesses and experts are appointed by the court
(i.e. their payments are included as court costs) in common law jurisdic-
tions each party selects and pays his or her own experts and witnesses.
The selection can also be directly made by lawyers, increasing the at-
torneys’ fees. Costs for evidence taking also include minor costs like
ordering, obtaining and copying documents. Costs for evidence taking
have a low impact on overall litigation costs, and they are secondary both
to court costs and attorneys’ fees3. However, for complex cases, they can
3See Hodges et al. (2010) and Reimann (2012).
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play an important role and must be carefully taken into account by par-
ties.
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2.3 The allocation of litigation costs
The previous Section has described the components of litigation costs,
this Section analyses instead how the private cost of civil litigation is
allocated between a Plaintiﬀ and a Defendant in diﬀerent jurisdictions.
According to the "Loser-pays Rule", the loser in a lawsuit is typically
required to bear the winner’s legal costs. The American Rule instead,
provides that each party ordinarily pays his or her own litigation costs,
independently of the litigation outcome. However, most of the systems
that apply the Loser-pays Rule do not fully reimburse the winner and
provide him or her only partial compensation4. On the other hand, also
under the American Rule, some costs may be shifted to the loser5. There-
fore, most jurisdictions operate in between the Loser-pays Rule and the
American Rule, making the aforementioned dichotomy too simplistic. In
this regard, the book edited by Reimann (2012) defines three possible
types of legal systems. First, the "Major Shifting Systems" where the
loser bears all the winner’s litigation costs, or at least a considerable part
of them, and where all the categories of litigation costs are subject to
shifting. Second, the "Partial Shifting Systems" where either only a part
of the winner’s overall litigation costs is shifted to the loser or where only
4See for instance, Carbonara et al. (2015).
5For instance, in the US some evidence costs can be shifted to the losing party.
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court costs and costs for evidence tacking are subject to shifting. Finally,
the "Minor Shifting Systems" where, although the American Rule is the
default rule, thanks to some exceptions, a small part of the winner’s legal
costs (usually court costs or costs for evidence taking) can be reimbursed
to the winner by the loser6. Although shifting (completely or partially)
or not shifting litigation costs to the loser defines a jurisdictions default
cost rule, in some countries, a third type of rule, where fees are shifted
in favour of only one party, can be applied as an exception. This is the
so-called One-Way fee-shifting Rule. Under this rule, one party recovers
at least part of the litigation costs, whereas the other party (i.e. the
disadvantaged one) is not allowed to do so. Thus, if the Plaintiﬀ was the
chosen beneficiary, a successful Plaintiﬀ would recover litigation costs,
while a successful Defendant would not. Subsections 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and
2.3.3 describe and analyse the Loser-pays Rule, the American Rule and
the One-way fee-shifting Rule respectively. For each rule the debate over
its positive and negative eﬀects on litigants’ behaviour and on the legal
system eﬃciency is also described.
6See for instanceVargo (1992).
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2.3.1 The Loser-pays Rule/English Rule
The Loser-pays Rule provides that the party who loses in court pays at
least a fraction of the other party’s litigation costs (regardless of whether
the winning party is the Plaintiﬀ or the Defendant). The rule is also
known as the English Rule; in fact, it can be traced back to the cen-
tury english law7. The Loser-pays Rule can either shift all the litigation
costs to the loser (unlimited costs-shifting), or only a fraction of the costs
(limited costs-shifting). National reports (Reimann (2012) and Hodges
et al. (2010)) show that, although most of the world’s jurisdictions pro-
vide for costs-shifting8, the type and the size of the costs that are shifted
vary greatly across diﬀerent legal systems9. Following the analysis of the
previous section, the application of unlimited or limited fee-shifting cat-
egorises a jurisdiction as a Major or Partial Shifting System respectively.
There are two main arguments in favour of the Loser-pays Rule. The
most popular justification reflects a basic idea of fairness. Proponents of
the Loser-pays Rule argue that it is just that the loser must compensate
the winner. The prevailing party, should not suﬀer financially for having
7The Statute of Gloucester (1278), one of the most important pieces of legislation enacted in the Parliament of
England during the reign of Edward I, was the probable origin of the English Rule (Woodroﬀe (1997)).
8The loser-pays rule is an important principle especially in European legal systems and it is expressed in all
European codes of civil procedure (see Bungard (2006)).
9For instance, some countries like Italy, Spain and Russia shift in all the categories of litigation costs and tend to
make the winner completely "whole". Others countries, like England, France and Australia instead completely shift
court costs and costs for evidence taking; however the winner never recovers all the litigation costs either because the
amount of recoverable attorneys’ fees is capped or because the Judge has the power to limit the recoverable attorneys’
fees amount Reimann (2012).
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to prove the justice of his or her position. For instance, Pfennigstorf
(1984) writes that "A claimant who is forced to resort to court action
to enforce his claim against a reluctant debtor is entitled to recover the
full value of the claim and should not be expected to be satisfied with a
lesser amount because of the necessity of suing. Likewise, one who suc-
cessfully defends himself against an unjustified claim raised by another
person should come out of the experience without financial loss". The
second main justification in favour of the Loser-pays Rule focuses instead
on the rule’s incentive eﬀects. The Loser-pays Rule could discourage the
filing of non-meritorious or frivolous cases; i.e. of lawsuits that, due to
their lack of legal merit, have little to no chance of being won10. In fact,
in the event of defeat a party would bear also the winner’s legal costs,
this two-fold risk would make the party unwilling to litigate unfounded
legal claims11. On the other hand, the opponents of the Loser-pays Rule
(especially with unlimited fee-shifting) emphasise that the rule adversely
aﬀects low income individuals (who also tend to be more risk-adverse than
high-income individulas). In order to avoid the large financial risk of hav-
ing to pay all the litigation costs, these individuals could indeed refrain
from bringing a valid claim to the court or could accept unfavourable
10Litigating frivolous cases would only represent a waste of public resources and time and would clog the litigation
system lowering its eﬃciency.
11See for instance Shavell (1981), Rowe (1982) and Farmer and Pecorino (1998).
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settlement amounts, unless they are quite confident to win12. In fact,
under the Loser-pays Rule it is true that the winning litigant gets away
free (or cheaply), but only at the risk of being hit so much harder in the
event of defeat (Reimann (2012)). It is also argued that a higher financial
risk in litigation increases parties expenditures in litigation, decreasing
the overall legal system eﬃciency. More precisely, under costs-shifting,
a successful litigant has a higher litigation outcome than in the case
without costs-shifting. For instance, if the Plaintiﬀ prevails in litigation,
under the American Rule she or he wins only the contested stake; under
the English Rule instead, she or he wins the stake and is also awarded
legal costs. Moreover, under a loser-pays system each additional unit of
legal expenditure has to be discounted by the probability of prevailing
at trial and being reimbursed. Therefore, under the English Rule, the
value of winning the case and the expected marginal benefit of legal ex-
penditures are higher resulting in greater legal expenditures during the
litigation process13. However, these issues can be somehow mitigated.
First, the negative eﬀect of the rule on poor litigants can be reduced by
the use of instruments for financing civil litigation like legal aid, success
oriented attorney’s fees or third party contracts14. Second, capping the
12Davis (1999).
13See for instance Braeutigam et al. (1984), Katz (1987) and Luppi and Parisi (2012).
14See for instance Tuil and Visscher (2010).
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amount of recoverable costs (limited cost-shifting) would make parties
less willing to "fight harder"15. Therefore, most of the contributions on
the Loser-pays Rule tends either to emphasise the virtues of the rule or
to find instruments aimed at reducing the possible shortcomings of the
rule.
2.3.2 The American Rule
The American Rule provides that each litigant has to bear only her or
his own litigation costs, regardless of the litigation outcome. Therefore,
the losing party does not have to reimburse the winners’ legal costs (or
just reimburses a small and insignificant fraction of them)16. As outlined
by the name of the rule, the only country that by and large rejects the
loser-pays principle is the United States. In fact, the default litigation
costs rule in the US enforces the principle that each side pays only her
or his own costs. Court costs and costs for evidence taking are rou-
tinely shifted; however the use of the court in the US is tipically cheap
and most of the evidence is carried out by lawyers (increasing attorneys’
fees). This makes the fraction of the costs that is shifted almost irrele-
vant17. Of course, the main arguments in favour of the American Rule
15See Carbonara et al. (2015) and Hyde (2002).
16For an historical overview of the America Rule see Leubsdorf (1984).
17See Reimann (2012).
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coincide with the main objections to the Loser-pays Rule that are anal-
ysed in the previous subsection. Briefly, under the American Rule, a
party with less resources should be less discouraged from going against a
party with a deeper pocket in fear of having to pay both her or his own
costs and the opponent’s costs18. Moreover, the American Rule decreases
the value of the litigated amount (the winning party gets the contested
stake but not the reimbursement of costs), and this lowers litigants expen-
ditures increasing the legal system eﬃciency19. On the other hand, the
main objections to the American Rule is that it increases the likelihood
of a Plaintiﬀ bringing to justice frivolous or non-meritorious cases or of
a Defendant continuing abusive practice (because litigants have to pay
anything except their costs increase)20. Moreover, it is true that without
cost-shifting the burden on each side is lower but at the price of having
to pay even when winning hands-down (Reimann (2012)). However, the
issues raised by the use of the American Rule are mitigated by the fact
that although the rule is a default rule, many statutes at both the fed-
eral and state levels allow the winner to recover reasonable litigation costs
(including attorney’s fees)21. The issue of frivolous and non-meritorious
cases reaching the court and clogging the legal system is also mitigated
18Davis (1999).
19See for instance Braeutigam et al. (1984), Katz (1987) and Luppi and Parisi (2012).
20See for instance Shavell (1981), Rowe (1982) and Farmer and Pecorino (1998).
21See Cohen (2006).
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by the presence of Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: if a
settlement oﬀer designated as an oﬀer of judgment is made in civil liti-
gation, the oﬀer is rejected and the final court decision is less favourable
than the final oﬀer that was made, then the party who rejected the oﬀer
is subject to reimburse at least a fraction of the opponent’s litigation
costs22.
2.3.3 The One-way fee-shifting Rule
The One-way fee-shifting Rule represents a third possible type of litiga-
tion cost rule and stands in between the American Rule and the Loser-
pays Rule. In fact, under the rule, one party recovers at least a fraction
of the litigation costs in the event of victory, whereas the other party
(i.e. the disadvantaged one) is not allowed to do so. Thus, if the Plain-
tiﬀ was the chosen beneficiary, a successful Plaintiﬀ would recover at
least a fraction of the litigation costs while a successful Defendant would
not. When the Plaintiﬀ is the favoured party the rule is also known as
the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule. On the other hand, when the
party that recovers litigation costs is the Defendant, the rule is known
as the Favouring Defendant fee-shifting Rule. The One-way fee-shifting
Rule originated as an exception to the American Rule. In particular,
22See Bone (2008).
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the American Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 197623 allowed
a Federal court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to a predefined (ei-
ther the Plaintiﬀ or the Defendant) prevailing party in certain civil rights
cases. Therefore, unlike the English or the American Rules, the One-way
fee-shifting Rule is not a default rule, but it is a rule that can be applied
depending on various circumstances; e.g. the type of litigants or the type
of case that is litigated. For instance, in the US, the Truth in Lending
Act (TILA) is a federal Law which sets norms aimed at protecting con-
sumers in their transactions with lenders and creditors. Among other
things, the act provides that a One-Way fee-shifting favouring Plaintiﬀ
Rule is applied in litigations where a consumer sues a creditor that vio-
lated one or more consumer rights under TILA24 (only the consumer can
recover litigation costs)25. In other countries, such as Israel and South
Africa, judges have full discretion with regard to fees award and denial,
and they often apply the One- Way fee-shifting Rule for certain types
of litigation and litigants26. European countries instead rarely apply the
One-way fee-shifting Rule. England and Wales, for instance, privilege
Plaintiﬀs in public interest litigation by protecting them from cost lia-
23Often referred to as "Section 1988" (since the law is codified in 42 U.S.C. 1988(b)).
24TILA can be found at 15 U.S.C. 1600 et. seq. It is implemented by the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Z at
12 CFR, Part 226 and by the Federal Reserve Board’s Oﬃcial Staﬀ Commentary to Regulations Z to (OSC).
25For other examples of these kinds of federal laws in the US see Krent (1993).
26For instance, Eisenberg et al. (2012) show how in Israel, in cases won by individual plaintiﬀs, corporations had
to pay their own litigation costs plus plaintiﬀs? litigation costs 99 percent of the time.
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bility if they lose their case27. Moreover, in 2013, England introduced a
One-way costs shifting Rule for personal injury cases: a losing Plaintiﬀ
does not pay a Defendant’s costs but a losing Defendant pays the Plain-
tiﬀ’s costs28. Unlike the American Rule vs the English Rule debate, the
debate over the positive and negative eﬀects of the One-Way fee-shifting
Rule on litigants’ behaviour and on the legal system eﬃciency is at an
embryonic phase29. Among other things, this thesis aims to fill the gap
by providing a detailed economic analysis of the One-way fee-shifting
Rule (Chapter 3 and 4 and also showing how the rule could be used as a
policy instrument in European countries (Chapter 5). The two main find-
ings are that: 1) the One-way fee-shifting Rule incentivises the favoured
litigant to exert more eﬀort than the disadvantaged one; this increases
the favoured litigant’s probability of winning at trial 2) the Favouring
Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule can be an alternative to legal aid for assisting
Plaintiﬀs in pursuing meritorious cases that would otherwise be dropped.
27See Reimann (2012).
28The Rule was implemented by the introduction of new Civil Procedure Rules 44.13 to 44.17 from 1 April 2013.
29Braeutigam et al. (1984) study the eﬀects on litigants’ expenditure and on the litigation rate of moving from the
American Rule to the One-way fee-shifting Rule finding an increase in the overall litigation costs. Rosen-Zvi (2009)
show instead that the rule can be used in order to reduce inequalities in the legal system.
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2.4 Mechanisms for financing civil litigation
This Section briefly describes the main instruments (pubic legal aid, legal
expenses insurances, success oriented fees, outside investments in litiga-
tion and class actions) aimed at distributing the litigants’ financial risk of
civil litigations among larger groups or at shifting it to diﬀerent individ-
uals. These instruments shift the burden of litigation costs from litigants
to other parties; e.g tax payers, lawyers, public institutions, private in-
dividuals etc. Understanding how these instruments work is crucial in
order to have a complete view of litigation costs and of the problem of
the access to justice30.
2.4.1 Public Legal Aid
Public legal aid is provided by states in order to assist people who cannot
aﬀord litigation costs but require it in order to obtain access to justice.
The conditions under which a citizen can receive legal aid and the way in
which legal aid is provided vary across diﬀerent jurisdictions. However,
all jurisdictions of the developed world provide some form of legal aid31.
30"From a law and economics perspective the fact that many diﬀerent financing mechanisms are available on the
market only seems positive and beneficial. The competition between those diﬀerent mechanisms can also allow an
increase of quality and a diversified supply of financing mechanisms to litigants.......A facilitative type of regulation
stimulating the emergence of diﬀering financing mechanisms in a competitive environment seems a better way to
simulate access to justice and hence to remedy market failures." See J.P.B de Mot, M.G. Faure, L.T. Visscher (2017),
TPF and its alternative: An economic approach in H van Boom (2017) (pp. 31-54).
31See Hodges et al. (2010) and Reimann (2012).
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The conditions for access to legal aid are generally set with reference to
financial resources and the merit of the case. Once these requirements
have been met the recipient can either receive a fraction of the trial ex-
penses he or she incurs (proportional legal aid system) or a fixed amount
(fixed legal aid system)32. Other forms of legal aid support litigants by
waiving court fees or cost for evidence taking or by directly providing
them with legal representation in court33. Public legal aid shifts the bur-
den of legal costs (or at least a fraction of it) from litigants to taxpayers.
The role of legal aid is crucial especially in European countries where,
according to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
those who lack suﬃcient resources to support the cost of a trial have the
right to receive state-financed legal aid34. This principle is confirmed in
the majority of the constitutions of European countries35. Although legal
aid is the most traditional instrument for facilitating people’s access to
justice, legal aid has the limit to help only a small fraction of litigants
who cannot access justice. First, the financial thresholds that have to be
satisfied in order to receive legal aid are usually very low, and this makes
legal aid unavailable for the middle class36. Second, in the presence of a
32For a more precise definition of proportional and fixed legal aid systems see Lambert and Chappe (2014).
33For instance this is the case in the US where the state usually provides the use of the court system at a low rate
for people that have few resources.
34See Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
35For a detailed description of public legal aid systems in European countries see Barendrecht et al. (2014).
36See Reimann (2012).
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loser-pays system, legal aid does not cover the costs the loser has to reim-
burse to the winner in the event of defeat. Third, legal aid usually covers
only a small fraction of the overall recipient’s litigation costs. Moreover,
legal aid increases pubic spending which is a major concern from a bud-
getary perspective. Therefore, legal aid is under the threat of reduction
and cutbacks37. This threat contributed to the recent development of
alternative instruments for financing civil litigation that are discussed in
the following subsections. All of these issues are considered in Chapter
3 which indeed identifies the One-way fee-shifting Rule as an alternative
(and in some cases more eﬃcient) instrument to legal aid for avoiding
that potential Plaintiﬀs do not bring to justice meritorious cases because
of the presence of cost barriers (in Europe).
2.4.2 Legal expenses insurances
Legal expenses insurance is a type of insurance that protects individuals
against the financial risk of a lawsuit. The burden of litigation costs
is then distributed among all the policyholders. There are two main
types of legal expenses insurances: the before-the-event insurance which
is purchased before a dispute occurs, and the after-the-event insurance
which is purchased after a dispute has arisen. While the former is quite
37See for instance Tuil and Visscher (2010).
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common among developed world’s jurisdictions38, the latter is quite rare
and can be mainly found in the United Kingdom (where, however, it
represents small percentage of total legal expenses insurances business)39.
Despite legal expenses insurance is one of the most common instruments
for financing civil litigation, it has some issues. First, the insurance
premium is usually high40 and it is not aﬀordable by all potential litigants.
Second, legal expenses insurances usually apply only to certain types of
lawsuits41 and the amount of costs that are covered by the policy is often
capped. Third, when the insurance is oﬀered by an insurer that also
oﬀers other forms of insurance, a conflict of interest can arise42.
2.4.3 Success oriented fees
Most of the jurisdictions where the determination of attorneys’ fees is left
to the market accomodates success-oriented lawyer fees either under the
form of contingent fees or conditional fees43. Under contingent fees, the
client’s lawyers get a share of the final judgment only if the client wins,
and they get nothing if the clients loses44. Under conditional fees, in-
38One exception is represented by the US where legal expenses insurances are quite rare (see Kilian (2003)).
39For a more detailed analysis of legal expenses insurances see Faure and De Mot (2011).
40Intuitively this is especially true for the after-the-event insurances. The UK report in Reimann (2012) shows that
the premium is usually around the 25% of the cover amount.
41Usually to defendants in tort cases.
42See for instance Bowdre (1993).
43Conditional fees are also known as No-win-no-fee Agreements.
44Here the client insures himself or herself against two risks: against paying lawyers in the event of defeat and also
against having to pay a lot if little is gained.
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stead, the client’s lawyers get a premium if the case is won and nothing if
the case is lost; the premium is not related to the adjudicated amount45.
Therefore, both contingent and conditional fess provide lawyers with a
higher fee if the case is won; the main diﬀerence between the two schemes
is that the former pays a percentage of the judgment, whereas the latter
pays an amount which is unrelated to the adjudicated amount. With
success oriented fees, the burden of litigation costs is shifted completely
or in part46 to the client’s lawyers. Contingent fees are widely used in
the US47 where they represent a trademark of the legal system48. In
most of the European countries contingent fess are, instead, forbidden.
Indeed, giving a lawyer a direct interest in the outcome of litigation is
seen as unethical49. This prohibition contributed to the development of
conditional fees that are instead permitted in almost all of the European
countries (as well as in the US and in the other developed world’s juris-
dictions)50. Conditional and contingent fees are intended to align lawyers
and clients’ interest so to incentivise lawyers’ eﬀort to represent the client.
Moreover, these schemes should favour access to justice for people who
45For a more detailed definition and comparison of contingent and conditional fees see Emons (2007).
46The client still has to pay the costs that are not reimbursed by the loser in the event of victory.
47Kritzer (1991) observes that in around 87% of all torts and 53% of all contractual issues in the US, plaintiﬀs
retain their lawyer on a contingency basis.
48See Reimann (2012).
49Pactum quota litis is not allowed by the ethical code of the European association of lawyers.
50For a detailed analysis of conditional fees see Kirstein and Rickman (2004).
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are not willing or able to support a high financial risk51. However, success
oriented fees present also some issues: they are not permitted by all ju-
risdictions; they may lead to really high payments in the event of victory
(especially with contingent fees); and they may incentivise lawyers to
sell-out their clients’ interest (e.g. if a quick settlement reaps substantial
awards whereas obtaining more money for the client beyond that point
may involve so much time that is not cost-eﬃcient for the lawyer)52.
2.4.4 Outside investments in litigation
Outside investment in litigation is a mechanism that allows third parties
either to finance a litigant’s legal fees in exchange for a share of any judg-
ment in the litigant’s favour or directly to buy and pursue a Plaintiﬀ’s
case. Therefore, there are two main types of outside investment in liti-
gation: 1) Third party funding, where a third party supports a litigant’s
litigation costs (either a Plaintiﬀ or a Defendant) in exchange of a judg-
ment share in the event of victory53. In other words, here the litigant
transfers the burden of litigation costs to the third party by renouncing to
a judgment share in the event of victory. 2) Assignment of claims, where
a Plaintiﬀ sells and assigns his or her case to a third party that directly
51See for instance Posner (1973b),Emons (2000) and Emons and Garoupa (2004).
52See Horowitz (1995).
53For a comparative legal and economic approach to the study of third party litigation funding and for a more
detailed analysis see De Morpurgo (2011).
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pursues the case in court and becomes liable for the final judgment54.
Here, the litigant entirely avoids the financial risk of litigation by selling
his or her case at a discounted rate. Third party fundings are widespread
and common in England, Wales, Australia and in some US states. In oth-
ers countries, on the contrary, third party fundings are either prohibited
(e.g. some US states) or only recently introduced (e.g. most European
jurisdictions). The strategy of assigning a claim is, instead, spread in
most civil law countries jurisdictions, while it is forbidden in almost all
common law countries55. The main issues of these instruments are that
they are suited only for cases that although they threaten to be costly,
they also promise to be rewarding, and also could incentivise an excessive
recourse to litigation56.
2.4.5 Class Actions
A class action is a lawsuit where one or several Plaintiﬀs represent the in-
terest of a large number of similarly situated claimants. This instrument
distributes the burden of litigation costs among all the people repre-
sented by the Plaintiﬀ. Although in a class action individual Plaintiﬀs
usually do not pay anything out-of-pocket, class action are limited to
54A new creditor replaces the old one and then sues in his or her own right.
55For a more precise analysis on which countries apply either third party fundings or assignment of claims see
Reimann (2012).
56See Lyon (2010).
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certain types of cases and are not provided by all the legal systems. In
particular, class action originated in the United States and is still pre-
dominantly a U.S. phenomenon57. However, Canada, as well as several
European countries with civil law, have made changes in recent years to
allow consumer organizations to bring claims on behalf of consumers (the
so-called representative or group litigations). For instance, on November
1, 2018 Germany introduced the new German Declaratory Model Ac-
tion (Musterfeststellungsklage)58. The new German Declaratory Model
Action allows specific and defined consumer associations (the so-called
qualified institutions) to initiate a declaratory action for the benefit of
consumers against corporations in order to achieve a binding declaratory
judgment regarding certain facts or legal questions. Consumers are not
directly involved. In order to obtain an enforceable title, the individual
consumer must assert any of her claims against the defendant company in
a separate subsequent dispute on the basis of the binding determinations
made in the model declaratory decision; this is a sort of opt-in option
for the individuals. Therefore, the model declaratory action diﬀers from
the US-style class actions in several aspect: 1) in a US-style class action
the decision is binding for all the individual members of the group unless
57For a detailed analysis of US class actions see Macey and Miller (1991).
58The Model was introduced in the wake of the so-called Diesel emissions issue involving Volkswagen and other car
manufacturers which became public for the first time in September 2015.
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they opt-out from the class. 2) In a US-style class action, the individual
members of the group participate in a potential award even if they have
not actively participated in the proceedings. 3) After the class action is
completed, no further claims can (or need to) be asserted in individual
follow-up proceedings.
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2.5 Case study: Italy
As it is well-known, Italy operates under a civil law system. However,
although Italian judges have a central and active role for developing the
facts of a case, lawyers have strong powers in shaping claims, defences
and evidences to submit to the judge. In fact, pursuant to article 115 in
the Code of Civil Procedure, the judge has the duty to serve a judgment
only on the basis of the evidence submitted by the parties or by the Public
Prosecutor in cases where he is required or permitted to intervene (cases
involving public interests). Therefore, Italy uses a blend of adversarial
and inquisitorial elements in its court system and can not be considered
as a truly inquisitorial jurisprudence59.
2.5.1 The components of litigation costs
Court costs: In Italy court costs vary according to the value of the case
and the trial activity performed. The so-called "Contributo unificato" is
a payment that parties have to make at the beginning of the case60. Other
court fees are charged for specific activities like the service of documents
or the registration of the final judgment. Court costs represent only
a small fraction of the case value (for instance for a dispute involving
59See Grossi and Pagni (2010).
60See Article 6 and 10 of the "Testo Unico Spese di Giustizia"; the fee is set with reference to the amount in
controversy.
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e25000, court fees amount to around e100) and are usually much lower
than attorneys’ fees61.
Attorneys’ fees: Attorneys’ fees in Italy are regulated by law62. A re-
cent regulation has liberated lawyers fees from statutory fixed maximum
and minimum amount. However, the ministerial decree 55/14 provides
that if the client and the lawyer do not find an agreement on costs, a fixed
tariﬀs system, set by the national bar council and approved by the Min-
ister of Justice, applies. Looking at the aforementioned tariﬀ system63
(which is a reference point for Italian lawyers), it is clear how attorneys’
fees are on average much larger than court costs and represent the largest
share of overall litigation costs (for instance for a dispute with a value in
between e26000 and e52000, the average attorney’s fee is e7000).
Costs for evidence taking: Costs for evidence taking in Italy are
mostly represented by experts’ fees. Experts are appointed by the court
who also sets their fees with reference to the relative professional tariﬀ.
However, parties also hire their experts that submit their reports to the
court64.
61See Reimann (2012).
62See Article 13, law 247/2012.
63Tariﬀs can be found in the ministerial decree 55/14.
64See Cappelletti (2013).
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2.5.2 The allocation of litigation costs
In Italy the basic rule concerning civil litigation costs allocation is set by
article 91 (paragraph 1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to
that provision, the loser in a lawsuit has to reimburse all the winner’s liti-
gation costs65; i.e. lawyers’ fees, court costs and costs for evidence taking.
Therefore, following the categorisation made by Reimann (2012), Italy
is a "Major shifting" system that applies the Loser-pays Rule with an
almost unlimited costs shifting. However, as stated by Article 92 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the judge is free to limit the amount of recover-
able costs when: 1) parties are both partly successful 2) there are "other
serious and exceptional reasons" that must be specifically indicated in the
judgment. In particular, the judge can exclude from costs shifting those
costs that he or she considers unnecessary or unfair. Moreover, Article 45
of law 699/2009, makes a victorious party liable for at least a part of her
or his legal costs when the party obtains a judgment which is less con-
venient than a conciliation oﬀer she or he had refused before. Therefore
the default Loser-pays Rule presents several exceptions and limitations
that usually reduce the share of litigation costs that is shifted.
65This principle is called "Principe della Soccombenza".
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2.5.3 Mechanisms for financing civil litigation
Public Legal Aid: Clause 24 of the Italian Constitution states: "Ev-
eryone is allowed to take legal action for the protection of her/his rights
and legitimate interests. Defence is an inviolable right at any grade of
the proceedings. The means of action and defence before all Courts are
guaranteed to the indigent by public institutions. The law determines
the conditions and legal means to remedy miscarriages of justice". In
this regard, Italy provides a public legal aid system: if a person falls
below a predetermined financial threshold (namely if his or her annual
income falls below e10,766.33) he or she may qualify for free legal assis-
tance and may be exempted from court fees and other charges66. Note
that the financial threshold is quite low and this can exclude from access
to justice people that while having an income above the threshold, have
no suﬃcient resources to bear the financial risk of a lawsuit. Of course,
in order to be eligible for legal aid a person has also to pass a merit
test which demonstrates that the claim is "not manifestly unfounded".
When the merit test and eligibility criteria are satisfied, the State bears
the litigation costs of the legal aid recipient.
Legal expenses insurances: As required by the European Directive
66This is the so-called "gratuito patrocinio".
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87/344/EEC, legal expenses insurances have been adopted in Italy67.
However, Legal expenses insurances are not widespread and are generally
related to automobile liability and household policies68.
Success-oriented fees: Success-oriented fees, and in particular con-
tingency fees, have been recently permitted by the law 247/2012, Article
13. The article provides that all the agreements between lawyers and
their clients concerning fees are permitted. These agreements, to be
valid, must be in writing; no other regulation is provided by the law.
Outside investments in litigation: Third parties litigation funding
is not specifically considered by the Italian courts. In principle, there is
nothing to prevent third party funding of litigation. However, there is
little evidence to suggest that third party funding will become prevalent
in the Italian legal system in the immediate future69.
Class actions: Class actions have been introduced in Italy in 2007
with Article 140-bis in the Italian Consumer Code70. The article regu-
lates the so-called "collective action" stating also the merits requirements
to be fulfilled in order to initiate it. Collective actions are "intended as an
avenue for consumer associations and committees to obtain, for the ben-
efit of their members whose "collective interests" were violated, damages
67See "Codice delle Assicurazioni private" (D.Lgs. 209/2005) art 173 and 175.
68See Il Sole-24Ore, January 26, 2009, 20.
69See De Morpurgo (2011).
70On January 1, 2010, Article 140 bis entered into force.
56 CHAPTER 2. CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
for certain contractual or tort claims, or in respect of unfair commercial or
anticompetitive conducts". However, class actions are not a widespread
phenomenon in Italy71.
71See "Class Actions in Italy: Recent Developments", Thomas F. Cullen and Margherita Magillo, Jones Day Milan
Oﬃce, May 9, 2013.
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2.6 Conclusion
The components of litigation costs, the rules governing their allocation
and the mechanisms for financing such costs greatly vary among diﬀer-
ent jurisdictions. In almost all jurisdictions attorneys’s fees represent
the main and the most unpredictable component of litigation costs. In
fact, while court costs are mainly predetermined small fees to be paid
in order to initiate or continue a case, costs for evidence taking are of-
ten born by lawyers and thus charged as part of attorneys’ fees. Most
of the developed world’s jurisdictions shift some of the winner’s litiga-
tion costs to the loser operating in between the pure English Rule and
the American Rule. Instruments aimed at distributing the litigants’ fi-
nancial risk of civil litigations among larger groups, are provided and
permitted by diﬀerent jurisdictions to various extents. However, these
instruments present some limitations and do not always guarantee the
right of full access to justice to everyone. This chapter provided a gen-
eral view on the topic of litigation costs and laid the foundations for a
complete understanding of the essays presented in this thesis.
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Chapter 3
The Economic Analysis of the
One-way Fee-shifting Rule
OVERVIEW
Among other things Chapter 2 provided an analysis of the diﬀerent rules
according to which litigation costs are allocated between parties. Briefly,
in the vast majority of Western countries, the loser is typically forced to
bear at least part of the winner’s legal expenses (the English rule), while
in the United States, each litigant traditionally bears her own costs (the
American rule). Further, there also exists a third type of rule where fees
are shifted in favour of only one party (the One-Way fee-shifting Rule).
While the American and the English rules have been deeply studied in
the Law and Economics literature, little contribution has been made to
the analysis of the One-Way fee-shifting Rule and on its eﬀects on the
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litigation process. Building on the existing literature, the aim of this
chapter is hence to provide a theoretical framework which accounts for
all of the characteristics of the One-way fee-shifting Rule and that allows
for comparison with the more common English Rule1. By the use of a
general model, first it will be demonstrated that the One-Way fee-shifting
Rule indeed incentivises the favoured litigant to exert more eﬀort than
the disadvantaged one and this increases the favoured litigant’s proba-
bility of winning at trial. Second, it will be shown how a movement from
the English Rule to a rule favouring one of the two parties has an am-
biguous eﬀect on litigants’ total legal expenditure and on the litigation
rate as well. As a matter of fact, while the shift always decreases the
disadvantaged litigant legal expenditure, the eﬀect on the advantaged
litigant expenditure is not predictable and depends on how the disad-
vantaged litigant reacts to her opponent’s legal expenditures choice. The
litigation rate decreases if total litigation costs increase and vice-versa
(trade oﬀ); therefore the eﬀect of the aforementioned movement on the
litigation rate can not be predicted as well. This chapter results can be
used as a theoretical support for all of the policies aimed at discouraging
certain types of litigants by the use of a One-way fee-shifting Rule.
1A comparison with the American Rule is provided Appendix C
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3.1 Introduction
In the field of Law and Economics, "fee-shifting rules" refers to the main
legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil litigation (mainly attor-
neys’ fees) between a Plaintiﬀ and a Defendant. In the vast majority of
Western countries, the loser is typically required to bear at least part of
the winner’s legal expenses; this mechanism is called the English Rule2.
Another rule is applied instead in the United States, where in a lawsuit,
a party always pays her own fees unless otherwise specified by contract or
statute; this is called the American Rule. Thus, under this mechanism,
the loser is not required to reimburse any of the winner’s legal costs.
As shown in Chapter 2, the possibility of alternative procedural schemes
has recently gained significant attention. As a matter of fact, in some
countries, a third type of rule where fees are shifted in favour of only one
party can be applied: the so-called One-Way fee-shifting Rule. Under
this rule, one party recovers the attorney’s fees in the event of litigation
whereas the other party (i.e. the disadvantaged one) is not allowed to do
so. Thus, if the Plaintiﬀ was the chosen beneficiary, a successful Plain-
tiﬀ would recover the attorney’s fees while a successful Defendant would
2This rule is also known as "The loser-pays Rule".
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not3.
In the United States, at the state and federal levels, various statutes
provide for this type of fee-shifting system. For instance, the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) is a federal Law which sets norms aimed at protect-
ing consumers in their transactions with lenders and creditors. Among
other things, the act provides that a One-Way fee-shifting favouring
Plaintiﬀ Rule is applied in litigations where a consumer sues a credi-
tor that violated one or more consumer rights under TILA4 (only the
consumer can recover litigation costs)5. In other countries, such as Is-
rael and South Africa, judges have full discretion with regard to fees
award and denial, and they often apply the One- Way fee-shifting Rule
for certain types of litigation and litigants6. Again, in countries such as
Italy, despite the default rule is the English Rule, the court can deviate
from this rule in various situations by denying some costs to the prevail-
ing party7. Finally, one-sided attorneys’ fee clauses, which provide for
3When the Plaintiﬀ (Defendant) is the party that can recover litigation costs, the terms One-Way fee-shifting
favouring Plaintiﬀ (Defendant) Rule and One-way pro-Defendant (pro-Plaintiﬀ) Rule are interchangeably used.
4TILA can be found at 15 U.S.C. 1600 et. seq. It is implemented by the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Z at
12 CFR, Part 226 and by the Federal Reserve Board’s Oﬃcial Staﬀ Commentary to Regulations Z to (OSC).
5For other examples of these kinds of federal laws see Krent (1993).
6See Eisenberg et al. (2012).
7From Chapter 2: in Italy, the standard rule concerning costs and fees allocation is set by Article 91, paragraph
1, of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to that provision, at the end of the proceeding the court will order
the losing party to reimburse her opponent’s expenses, including lawyer’s fees. Therefore, what is adopted in Italy
is clearly the English rule (in Italian, it is called "principio della soccombenza"). The court can deviate from this
rule in several situations. Firstly, the court may exclude those costs that are thought to be excessive or unnecessary.
Secondly, the court may order a party to reimburse the other party any expense incurred as a result of her unfairness,
irrespective of who was successful. Finally, if no party is totally successful, or there is another good reason, the court
may decide that each party bears her own costs. In sum, Italian judges have a certain degree of discretion in awarding
or denying fees to the prevailing party.
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only one party to recover costs in case of litigation, are becoming more
prevalent in the contract terms of industrialised countries8. Despite the
wide application of such rules, no real and conclusive contribution has
been given in the literature on the economic analysis of its structure and
legal eﬀects. The main goal of this Chapter is hence to provide a theo-
retical framework which accounts for all of the features of the One-way
fee-shifting Rule and that allows for comparison with the more common
English Rule9. The One-Way fee-shifting Rule is the only rule in which
the two parties face diﬀerent expected costs from litigation; intuitively,
this significantly aﬀects the entire litigation process. More intuitively,
the advantaged party should be more willing to engage in litigation and
to exert a lot of eﬀort, due to her ability to recover attorney’s fees, while
the disadvantaged party should be deterred from pursuing a claim or
asserting a defense to the lawsuit. In some contexts, this rule may ap-
pear unfair. For example, the unilateral fee clauses are often the result
of the weaker party’s inability to negotiate the terms of the contract10.
Thus, some States have prohibited these clauses11. At the same time, it
is clear how in other contexts, the features of the One-way fee-shifting
8For instance, some contracts between a tenant and a landlord provide that in case of litigation over unpaid rent,
only the landlord can recover attorney’s fees.
9For the comparison with the American rule see Appendix C of this Chapter.
10See Bright (2012).
11The Florida legislature, in 1988, came up with a solution to this problem. If a contract contains a unilateral
attorney-fee clause, a court may also allow reasonable attorney fees to the other party if it prevails. The unilateral
clause is statutorily rendered reciprocal.
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Rule may allow policymakers to counterbalance gaps between litigants
that do not depend on the merit of the case12, or even to block certain
abusive recourses to litigation.
This Chapter provides a general theoretical model which shows the
aforementioned discouraging power of the One-way fee-shifting Rule. It
will be demonstrated that the rule is indeed an eﬀective policy instru-
ment for discouraging (encouraging) the disadvantaged (favoured) liti-
gant. The chapter also describes the implications for total legal expen-
ditures and the litigation rate13 due to a movement from the English
system14 to a system favouring one of the two parties. These implica-
tions should be considered and weighted upon when deciding whether to
apply a One-way fee-shifting system or not. The Chapter results can be
used as a theoretical support for all of the policies aimed at discouraging
certain type of litigants by the use of a One-way fee-shifting system15.
The Chapter is structured as follows. After a literature review on the
topic, in Section 3.3, and more precisely in Subsection 3.3.2 a general
model is used to provide an analysis of the characteristics of the One-
way fee-shifting Rule and to understand why, unlike the English Rule, the
One-Way fee-shifting Rule can be used as a policy instrument for gaining
12The exact meaning of "gaps" and merit will be discussed in Section 4 of the chapter.
13Thus the major implications for the legal system eﬃciency (See Luppi and Parisi (2012)).
14The terms Rule and system are used interchangeably.
15See Section 5 for examples.
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a justice where the outcome of civil litigations is not aﬀected by litigants
”gaps” that do not depend on the merits of the case16. In Subsection 3.3.3
instead, the eﬀects of adopting the One-Way fee-shifting Rule (in terms
of transitioning from an English Rule17) on total legal expenditures and
on the litigation rate is investigated. Section 3.4 explains the meaning
of litigants "gaps". Briefly, "ability gaps" refers to all the situations
in which one of the two litigants has a higher return from spending in
litigation than the other. The merit of the case is then one of the factors
that may contribute to the presence of ability gaps. The aim is to show
when the adoption of a One-way fee-shifting system may be desirable.
Finally, Section 3.5 presents concluding remarks.
16Again the exact meaning of ’gaps’ and merit will be discussed later on in this chapter.
17For the comparison with the American rule see Appendix C.
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3.2 Related Literature and Contribution
3.2.1 Literature Overview
The literature on fee-shifting is extensive and is still developing due to the
contributions of various theoretical, experimental and empirical research.
The eﬀects of alternative procedural rules on civil litigation can be an-
alytically derived thanks to Tullock (1967) and Tullock et al. (1983)’s
Model of Rent-seeking. Tullock provided a basic model where parties in-
cur costs in the unproductive competition over a fixed rent18. It is clear
how legal expenditures at a civil trial constitute an interesting type of
rent-seeking contest. As a matter of fact, in most litigation settings, by
spending resources, litigants compete for the winning of a fixed prize.
Consider, for instance, litigation involving two parties fighting for the
appropriation of a piece of land whose ownership is uncertain. Although
litigation may dissipate some of the value of winning the case, the value
of the land is given and is to be considered independent of the parties’
litigation choices. This chapter refers to the literature which focuses on
risk neutral parties’ behaviour at trial and on their decision on whether
to litigate or not. In fact, both choices directly depend on the parties’
estimates of the ultimate litigation’s outcome. This chapter does not
18The rent is not aﬀected by parties choices.
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follow the literature on the settlement stage; for simplicity it is indeed
assumed that parties can not agree on a settlement19.
Braeutigam et al. (1984) developed a general model to study the eﬀects
of moving from the American Rule to the English Rule or the One-way
fee-shifting Rule on litigants’ expenditures and on the Plaintiﬀ’s incen-
tive to sue. The author concluded that both the English Rule and the
One-Way fee-shifting Rule increase litigants total expenditures in litiga-
tion when compared to the American Rule. However, the eﬀect on the
Plaintiﬀ’s incentive to sue is ambiguous. Katz (1987) was the first scholar
to explain Braeutigam et al. (1984) results by applying Tullock’s specific
success function in the general model. The author concluded that the
English Rule encourages greater expenditure in litigated cases than the
American Rule. As a matter of fact, under the English Rule a successful
litigant has a higher litigation outcome than under the American Rule: if
the Plaintiﬀ prevails in litigation, under the American Rule she wins only
the contested stake, under the English Rule instead, she wins the stake
and she is also awarded legal costs. Moreover, under a loser-pays system
each additional unit of legal expenditure has to be discounted by the
probability of prevailing at trial and being reimbursed. Thus, under the
English Rule, the value of winning the case and the expected marginal
19The analysis on settlement stage is considered in Chapter 5 of the thesis.
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benefit of legal expenditures are higher than under the American Rule
resulting, other things being equal, in greater legal expenditures during
the litigation process. As the vast majority of the literature, Katz (1987)
used Tullock’s functions for comparisons between the American and the
English Rules only and did not consider the possibility of One-way fee-
shifting. Hause (1989) extended the Katz Rent-seeking Model showing
how although the English Rule provides higher legal expenditures with
respect to the American Rule, the English Rule decreases the Plaintiﬀ’s
incentive to sue and hence the litigation rate. Indeed, under the English
rule, parties are less willing to enter in litigation because the greater ex-
penditures lower the claim’s expected value; this is because of the higher
costs litigants face in case of loss. Farmer and Pecorino (1999) intro-
duced into the model the possibility for parties of having a decreasing or
increasing return to litigation by allowing for diﬀerent degrees of Plain-
tiﬀ’s complaint merit. The authors found that only in the presence of
decreasing return to scale in the legal investment20 the English Rule pro-
vides a lower litigation rate than the American Rule. Luppi and Parisi
(2012) solved the Litigation Rent-seeking Model under the special case
in which the Defendant could bring a counterclaim against the Plaintiﬀ.
20i.e. when the positive eﬀect, in terms of litigation outcome, of investing in legal expenditures decreases as legal
expenditures increase.
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The authors showed that, in equilibrium, while under the American Rule
parties spend more than half of the value of the case on their litigation
eﬀorts, under the English Rule parties always dissipate more than half
of the case value. Again, even though under the English rule individuals
may rationally spend more in litigation, they may choose to litigate less
often.
To sum up, the main result of the literature is that the English Rule
decreases the number of initiated trials and increases legal expenditures
for litigated case. This results in a trade-oﬀ between legal expenditures
per trial and the litigation rate (incentive to sue) (Baye et al. (2000)).
This finding is also confirmed by experimental and empirical research.
Hughes and Snyder (1995) using data from Florida, where the English
rule was applied to medical malpractice claims during the period 1980-
85, examined the rules’ eﬀects on litigation process. Among other things,
data confirmed that the English Rule significantly decreased the litiga-
tion rate. Coughlan and Plott (1997) conducted an experiment to test
the basic rent-seeking model by Katz (1987) and concluded that the data
demonstrates that game theoretic equilibrium models produce good qual-
itative predictions of the relative institutional response to changes in the
allocation rule. They indeed concluded that the English Rule produces
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significantly higher expenditures at trial than the American Rule. On the
other hand, the frequency of trial is significantly lower under the English
Rule.
The aforementioned literature uses the total legal expenditures and the
litigation rate as the main proxies for the legal system eﬃciency. Higher
(lower) total litigation costs (litigation rate) reduces the social welfare
loss. Indeed, unlike the eﬀorts of two competitors in the marketplace, the
eﬀorts (legal expenditures) of two litigants are not capable of increasing
the value of the litigated asset, and cause a dissipation of a good portion
of its net value (Parisi (2002)). However, total costs of litigation are
the product of two factors: total expenditures per litigated case, and
the number of cases that are actually litigated. Therefore, an excessive
recourse to litigation (a higher litigation rate) may reduce the social
welfare loss as well (Katz and Sanchirico (2010)).
More recent contributions focused instead on the eﬀect of the English
Rule and the American Rule on case selection and legal evolution. Luppi
and Parisi (2012) showed that, under the American Rule, as the Plaintiﬀ
does not fully internalise the costs of the litigation, she will be more likely
to file cases with low probability of success. On the other hand, under
the English Rule, the loser-pays rule forces a losing party to internalise
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the litigation costs imposed on his opponent. This leads prospective
litigants not to file cases with low success probability. Therefore, although
the English Rule provides higher legal expenditures, the rule not only
reduces the litigation rate but also avoids that non meritorious cases are
litigated. Non meritorious cases should not be litigated and represent
a welfare loss and a decrease in the legal system eﬃciency. Moreover,
in common law systems, the selection of cases has an impact on the
evolution of judge-made law. Cases with a high probability of success,
once they are adjudicated, would create a "predominant flow of positive
precedents". This would reinforce future similar cases. On the contrary,
cases that have a low probability of success will create a "flow of negative
precedents", which may further reduce the probability of success of future
similar claims (Parisi and Fon (2009)). Carbonara et al. (2015) analysed
a partial English Rule where the amount of recoverable costs for the
winning party is uncertain. Most interesting is that under this rule only
cases with "balanced merit" are litigated; those are the cases that, from
a social point of view, the society wants to see litigated, in order to
promote clarity and certainty in the law. Indeed frivolous cases should
not be filed, and strong cases should be settled without litigation. The
English Rule creates this desirable selection eﬀect.
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As discussed in the thesis introduction, the existing theoretical litera-
ture refers mainly to the analysis of the American and the English Rules,
ignoring the relevance of alternative procedural schemes. Again, the only
theoretical contribution accounting for the One-Way fee-shifting Rule is
the one by Braeutigam et al. (1984). However, rather than providing
an economic analysis of the intrinsic characteristics of the One-Way fee-
shifting Rule, Breautigan et al. focused on the eﬀects of applying such a
rule on total legal expenditures and on the litigation rate. In this regards,
by the use of a general rent-seeking model21 the authors demonstrated
how moving from the American Rule to the One-Way fee-shifting one
increases total legal expenditures and ambiguously aﬀects the favoured
party decision to engage in litigation. A possible attempt for the analysis
of alternative fee-shifting rules has also been made in experimental liter-
ature by Coursey and Stanley (1988) and Rowe Jr and Anderson (1996).
These authors analysed a special type of rule, where a party who rejected
a pretrial oﬀer must pay all the litigation costs if the judge’s award is
less favourable than the pretrial oﬀer22. The result is basically that the
rule is eﬀective in decreasing the litigation rate. However, these studies
can not be introduced in a framework where the litigants compete for a
21Without using a particular form for the success function.
22California Law 998, Federal Rule 68.
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fixed stake; moreover the One-Way fee-shifting Rule greatly diﬀers from
the rule analysed by these authors. It is indeed clear how the Law and
Economics contribution to the One-Way fee-shifting Rule is still poor and
should be improved.
3.2.2 Contribution
This chapter aims at contributing to the existing literature by focusing
on the economic analysis of the One-way fee-shifting Rule. The "Par-
tial One-way fee-shifting Rule", where the advantaged party is able to
recover just a fraction of costs in case of litigation, will be analysed as
well23. The Chapter also provides some policy implications. The first
goal is to demonstrate how the One-Way fee-shifting Rule aﬀects the lit-
igation process by increasing the probability of winning at trial for the
favoured party. Following the existing literature the chapter uses then
a general rent-seeking model where each party selects her level of legal
expenditure in order to win a case. One of the key characteristics of ex-
isting models is that litigants may face diﬀerent returns from investing in
litigation24 because of diﬀerences in their legal merit25. However, there
are other factors that can generate a diﬀerence in litigants’ return from
23This concept will be better explained later in the chapter.
24On the probability of winning at trial.
25From the legal dictionary: "merits refers to the substance of a legal dispute and not the technicalities that can
aﬀect a lawsuit".
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legal expenditures. For instance, one reason may be that one party is a
person or an institution which has access to better legal representation
and for which litigation does not represent a stress or a waste of time26.
This chapter also contributes to the existing literature by considering
then the possibility for litigants to diﬀer not only in terms of the merit
of the case but more generally in terms of ability. For the purpose of
this analysis, "ability gaps" refers to all of the situations in which one of
the two litigants has a higher return from spending in litigation than the
other. The merit of the case is indeed only one of the factors that aﬀects
the ability. Diﬀerences in ability play an important role in the litigation
process; in fact, the more able party can easily support legal costs and
win the case. It is assumed that in an ideal legal system, the merit of the
case should be the only relevant characteristic that aﬀects the return from
legal expenditures (i.e. the litigant with the stronger claim should have
a higher return from investing in litigation). This concept assumes that
for every case of litigation, a correct legal outcome always exists. This
is particularly true for cases which involve a fixed stake under dispute.
Therefore, in this Chapter litigants may face ”ability gaps” in a sense of
diﬀerence between their returns to litigation caused by factors other than
26This would generally translate to lower opportunity costs for litigation in the first place. A more exhaustive
explanation of ability is oﬀered in Subsection 3.4 of the chapter.
3.2. RELATED LITERATURE AND CONTRIBUTION 75
the merit of the case. By the introduction of the ability it is shown how
the One-Way fee-shifting Rule is the only rule that can be used to reduce
the eﬀects of ”ability gaps” on the litigation process. This concept has
never been considered in the literature. In fact, the adoption of diﬀerent
fee-shifting systems has always been viewed as a potential policy aimed
at making the legal system more eﬃcient; this chapter will go further
by also viewing the One-Way fee-shifting Rule as an instrument towards
the goal of fairness27. Finally, following Braeutigam et al. (1984) the ef-
fects of moving from the English system to the One-way fee-shifting one
on total legal expenditures and on the litigation rate are considered28.
Breautigam et al. only consider the eﬀect on litigants expenditures of
moving from the American rule to the English or to the One-way fee
shifting one without allowing for ability gaps between litigants.
27Again, in this regard it is assumed that fairness increases when the litigation outcome is not aﬀected by "ability
gaps" depending on factors diﬀerent than the real merit of the case.
28As the vast majority of the literature, this chapter considers total legal expenditures and the litigation rate as
the two main proxies for the legal system eﬃciency. Future works can investigates on the One-way fee-shiofting Rule
eﬀects on case selections and on the Law evolution.
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3.3 The Model
Following Braeutigam et al. (1984), Katz (1987) and Hause (1989) this
model considers a sequential two-player litigation game, where each risk
neutral player selects her level of eﬀort, in order to win a case. The value
of the contested case is assumed to be fixed (i.e. the dispute is not on
the amount in question) and is not aﬀected positively or negatively by
the parties’ expenditures29. Each litigant can increase her probability of
winning the case by undertaking a higher litigation eﬀort (i.e. increas-
ing legal expenditures). Consider, for example, litigation involving two
parties, where the Plaintiﬀ claims the ownership of a Defendant’s land
V . The players’ eﬀort in this case may be interpreted as the parties’
investments (through lawyers) in discovery (e.g., number of witnesses or
pieces of evidence that litigants brings to court to support their respec-
tive claims). The larger the Plaintiﬀ’s investment in discovery and hence
litigation, the larger the probability that the court will be persuaded by
the evidence presented and the larger the probability that she will win
the case (be granted ownership of the land).
The model permits to analyse and compare three diﬀerent fee-shifting
29Relaxing the "fixed-stake" assumption might provide a fruitful extension for future research; by allowing for
endogenous stakes, it would be possible to analyse, first theoretically and then empirically, whether and to what
extent judges correct the eﬀects of fee-shifting rules by means of their discretionary power in allocating the contested
stake.
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rules. The first one is the English Rule: the loser bears the winner’s
legal expenses. Then, the One-Way pro-Defendant Rule, where only the
Defendant can recover litigation costs in case of her winning. Finally,
also a system where a successful Plaintiﬀ can recover only a fraction
of her litigation costs (while a successful Defendant can fully recover
litigation costs) is considered; this system is called a Partial One-way
pro-Defendant system. For the sake of simplicity, the model does not
consider the favouring Plaintiﬀ rules; indeed, the implications and the
results of the One-Way pro-Plaintiﬀ rule are symmetric with respect to
the One-way favouring Defendant Rule case30. The components of the
model are:
• X and Y are the legal expenditures for the Plaintiﬀ and for the
Defendant respectively. Each unit of X and Y has a unitary cost.
• p¯ ⌘ p(X, Y,A) 2(0, 1) is the probability that the Plaintiﬀ wins the
case. This probability depends on litigants’ expenditures and on the
ability A. 1  p¯ is then the probability that the Defendant wins the
case.
• A 2 (0,1) is the relative ability of Plaintiﬀ vis-a’-vis Defendant.
30The chapter aims at providing policies advise for European countries. This is why the model does not consider
the American Rule. However, for the purpose of completeness the Appendix includes a Section accounting for the
American Rule as well.
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The higher the value of A, the higher the Plaintiﬀ’s ability. It is
assumed that if A < 1 the Defendant is more able than the Plaintiﬀ31
and vice versa.
• V is the fixed stake for which the Plaintiﬀ has sued the Defendant.
• f2[0, 1] is the fraction of Plaintiﬀ’s litigation costs X that the Plain-
tiﬀ can recover in the event of victory. Of course, 1 f is the fraction
of Plaintiﬀ’s litigation costs X that the Plaintiﬀ cannot recover in
the event of victory. The Defendant always fully recovers her fees in
case of victory32.
• ⇧P and ⇧D are the expected returns from litigation for the Plaintiﬀ
and for the Defendant respectively; they are defined as follows:8<:⇧P = p¯(V   (1  f)X) + (1  p¯)( Y  X)⇧D = (1  p¯)(0) + p¯( V   fX   Y )
In words, when the Plaintiﬀ wins (with probability p¯) she gets the
stake V and she pays her non-recoverable litigation costs ((1 f)X).
When instead the Plaintiﬀ loses (with probability 1 p¯) she pays both
her litigation costs and the Defendant’s costs (X and Y ). The same
reasoning applies for the Defendant’s expected return from litigation.
Note that when the Defendant wins (with probability 1 p¯) her payoﬀ
31The meaning of relative ability will be more precisely defined later on.
32f depends on the exact shifting rule, this will be discusses in more detail below.
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is 0. As a matter of fact, in this case the Defendant simply avoids
to lose the stake V and fully recovers litigation costs. After some
computations, ⇧P and ⇧D can be rewritten as follow:8<:⇧P = p¯(V + fX + Y )  Y  X⇧D =  p¯(V + fX + Y )
If f = 1, the English Rule applies: the loser is required to bear all
of the winner’s legal expenses. If f = 0 the complete One-way fee-
shifting pro-Defendant Rule applies: the Defendant is always able to
recover fees, while the Plaintiﬀ cannot. For 0 < f < 1, the Plaintiﬀ
can recover only a fraction of her fees and hence a hybrid rule which
lies in between the English Rule and the complete One-way pro-
Defendant Rule applies. This hybrid rule is called partial One-way
fee-shifting pro-Defendant Rule. The lower the value of f , the more
the Defendant is favoured by the rule and hence the closer the rule
is to a complete One-way pro-Defendant system.
3.3.1 Assumptions
The analysis is based on the following assumptions:
• Assumption 1 (AS1)
px > 0 (py < 0), pxx < 0 (pyy > 0). Where subscripts indicate partial
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diﬀerentiation. For instance, px and py is the partial derivative of the
probability function p(X, Y,A) with respect to X and Y .
The probability that the Plaintiﬀ wins is increasing (decreasing) in
the Plaintiﬀ’s expenditure (Defendant’s expenditure) at a decreasing
(increasing) rate.
• Assumption 2 (AS2)
pA > 0
The higher the Plaintiﬀ’s relative ability, the higher her probability of
winning at trial. Therefore, ability refers to all those characteristics
(except legal expenditures) that enable one party to increase her
probability of victory. Thus, when the Plaintiﬀ is more able than the
Defendant, in order to have an equal probability of victory at trial,
the Defendant must spend more than the Plaintiﬀ.
• Assumption 3 (AS3)
If A = 1:
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
p > 1/2 when X > Y
p = 1/2 when X = Y
p < 1/2 when X < Y
3.3. THE MODEL 81
If A < 1:
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
p > 1/2 when X > Y + e
p = 1/2 when X = Y + e
p < 1/2 when X < Y + e
If A > 1:
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
p > 1/2 when X > Y   c
p = 1/2 when X = Y   c
p < 1/2 when X < Y   c
When the Plaintiﬀ and the Defendant have the same ability (i.e.
A = 1), the litigant with the highest (lowest) legal expenditure has a
higher (lower) equilibrium probability of winning at trial. If, instead,
the litigants spend the same amount, the equilibrium probability of
winning is the same. When the Defendant is more able than the
Plaintiﬀ (i.e. A < 1), the probability that the latter wins is lower
with respect to the previous case, other things being equal. There-
fore, the Plaintiﬀ has to spend more to reach the same level of prob-
ability, in order to compensate her disadvantage in term of ability.
For instance, if the Plaintiﬀ wants to be more likely of succeeding
(i.e. p > 1/2), then spending X > Y is not enough: she must add
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an amount such that her ability deficit is counterbalanced; this posi-
tive amount e, is decreasing in A. The same reasoning applies when
the Plaintiﬀ is more able than the Defendant (i.e. A > 1). In this
case, c is the amount needed for the Defendant to compensate for
the Plaintiﬀ higher ability.
• Assumption 4 (AS4)
pxA > 0 , pyA < 0 , pxA =  pyA
The marginal productivity of X(Y ) increases (decreases) with A.
Moreover, the magnitude of these changes is the same33. This as-
sumption provides that abilities and returns from legal expenditures
are positively related, i.e. the higher a party’s ability, the more eﬀec-
tive is one unit of investment in legal expenditure. It is duly noted
that this assumption is based on a generalised concept of legal ex-
penditures. In reality, there are various forms of legal expenditures,
some for which abilities may not have any eﬀect (e.g. administrative
filings). Furthermore, there is no intuitive basis to suggest an oppo-
site case (where the more a litigant is able, the less eﬀective is her
legal expenditure). Therefore, the net eﬀect across all forms of legal
expenditures will be subject to this assumption.
33Intuitively, the more able one litigant is, the higher will be her marginal return from investing in legal expenditures.
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• Assumption 5 (AS5)
For each A:
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
px =  py when X = Y
px >  py when Y > X
px <  py when Y < X
The magnitude of the marginal productivity of X is higher (lower)
than the one for of Y only when Y > X (X < Y ). They have the
same value when X = Y . This is true for every value of A. This is
directly derived from AS1 and AS4.
• Assumption 6 (AS6)
dX
dV ,
dY
dV > 0
Any increase in the stake for which the Plaintiﬀ has sued the Defen-
dant will increase the expenditures by both parties.
3.3.2 The discouraging nature of the One-Way fee-
shifting Rule8>><>>:
⇧P = p¯(V + fX + Y )  Y  X
⇧D =  p¯(V + fX + Y )
Agents are assumed to be rational, hence they seek to maximise their
own expected return from litigation (i.e. ⇧P or ⇧D), by choosing how
84 CHAPTER 3. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE ONE-WAY FEE-SHIFTING RULE
much to spend in the litigation process (i.e. X or Y ). Therefore, the
analysis is conducted using the standard Nash equilibrium concept (full
information). A stable equilibrium34 thus consists of choices of X and Y
such that each party simultaneously optimises the value of the lawsuit
herself. Formally, this requires that each litigant chooses the optimal
level of eﬀort according to the following first order conditions:35
@⇧P
@X
= 0) (Y + V + fX)px + pf = 1
@⇧D
@Y
= 0)  (V + fX + Y )py/p = 1
In words, both litigants will continue to invest in litigation until marginal
benefits, on the left side of equation, equal marginal costs, on the right
side of the equation. For instance, the Plaintiﬀ will continue to invest
in legal expenditure until her benefit in terms of higher probability of
winning at trial ((Y + V + fX)px + pf) is equal to her marginal cost,
hence the cost of investing one more unit in legal expenditure (1).
The equations can be rearranged as:
34Stable means that small perturbations do not result in movements from the equilibrium.
35At a regular interior Nash equilibrium it is also true that @
2⇧P
@X2
< 0 and @
2⇧D
@Y 2
< 0. Thus it is assumed that the
second order conditions are negative.
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@⇧P
@X
= 0) (Y + V + fX)px + pf   1 = 0
@⇧D
@Y
= 0)  (V + fX + Y )py   p = 0
Thus it follows that:
(Y + V + fX)px + pf   1 =  (V + fX + Y )py   p
After some computations the following condition must hold in equilib-
rium:
px + py
 py =
1  p(1 + f)
p
(1)
The following conditions must hold in order to satisfy the equilibrium
condition (1) and AS3 of the model:
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
X < Y If p > 11+f
X = Y If p = 11+f
(2)
X > Y If p < 11+f
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For instance, when p > 11+f , the right hand side of (1) is negative
36; thus,
to satisfy the equilibrium condition, the left hand side has to be negative
too. The left hand side is negative only when px + py < 0; following the
model AS5, this is true only when X > Y . The same reasoning applies
when p = 11+f and when p <
1
1+f .
Proposition 1:
- Under the English Rule (i.e. f = 1) the litigant with the highest ability
always spends more than the other one. If instead the litigants have the
same ability, they will spend the same amount in equilibrium.
X < Y if A < 1
X = Y if A = 1
X > Y if A > 1
- Under the complete One-way pro-Defendant fee-shifting Rule (i.e. f =
0) the Defendant always spends more than the Plaintiﬀ. This is true for
each possible level of ability.
X < Y , 8A
- Under the partial One-Way pro-Defendant fee-shifting Rule (i.e. 0 <
f < 1), the Defendant spends more than the Plaintiﬀ both when the
36 1 p(1+f)
p < 0 if p >
1
1+f .
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litigants have the same ability and when the Defendant is more able
than the Plaintiﬀ. When the Plaintiﬀ is more able that the Defendant,
the latter spends more only up to a certain level of ability, say Aˆ > 1. In
this point, the litigants spend the same amount, but beyond the Plaintiﬀ
spends more than the Defendant.
X < Y if A < 1
X < Y if A = 18>>>>>><>>>>>>:
X < Y if A < Aˆ
X = Y if A = Aˆ
X > Y if A > Aˆ
Up to Aˆ > 1, the Defendant tries to oﬀset her ability deficit by spending
more than the Plaintiﬀ. The lower the value of f , the higher is the value
of Aˆ, thus the more the Plaintiﬀ is favored37.
37See Appendix A for proof.
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Proposition 2:
- When the English Rule is applied (i.e. f = 1) the litigant with the
highest ability always has a higher probability of winning at trial.
- When the One-Way pro-Defendant Rule is applied (i.e. 0  f < 1), the
Defendant may have a higher probability of winning at trial even when
she is less or equally able than the Plaintiﬀ (i.e. when A   1). Indeed,
the One-way pro-Defendant Rule allows the Defendant to spend more
than the Plaintiﬀ even when the Defendant is less able (for 1 < A < Aˆ
when 0 < f < 1 and for A > 1 when f = 0). When the positive eﬀect of
the Defendant’s expenditure on the probability of victory dominates the
Defendant’s deficit in ability (px + py > pA), she has a greater chance to
win than the Plaintiﬀ 38. On the other hand, when the Defendant is more
able than the Plaintiﬀ, she always has a higher probability of winning at
trial.
To sum up, the Defendant is favoured by a One-way pro-Defendant Rule
in a sense that she is incentivised to spend more than the Plaintiﬀ in
trying to overcome a possible ”ability gap”. This reduces the equilib-
rium probability of victory for the Plaintiﬀ. This result is exacerbated
38Namely, when 1 < A < Aˆ the Defendant spends more than the Plaintiﬀ even when she is less able. If in this
range (or in a part of it) the eﬀect of the diﬀerence in legal expenditures on the probability of success overcomes the
ability one, the Defendant has a higher equilibrium probability of success even if she is less able. This depend on the
exact form which is chosen for p¯.
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the lower the value of f , and then the closer the rule is to a complete
One-way pro-Defendant Rule. The Plaintiﬀ’s equilibrium probability of
success increases with f , while the opposite is true for the Defendant’s
one. Unlike the English Rule, the features of the One-way fee-shifting
Rule may therefore allow policymakers to counterbalance ”ability gaps”
between litigants and this makes the rule a possible instrument for poli-
cies aimed at incentivising certain types of litigants39.
3.3.3 Implications on the legal system eﬃciency
In the previous Section, it has been shown why and how the One-way fee-
shifting Rule is an eﬀective policy instrument aimed at discouraging the
disadvantaged litigant. This Section describes instead the implications
of moving from the English system to the One-way favouring Defendant
one on litigants’ expenditures, dissipation of case value and parties choice
to engage in litigation. These eﬀects are of course related to the legal
system eﬃciency and then should be considered when deciding whether
to apply a One-Way fee-shifting system or not. Braeutigam et al. (1984)
is followed in this regards.
39Examples of this policies are provided in the next section of this chapter.
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Legal expenditures
As previously shown, starting from the litigants’ expected returns from
litigation: 8>><>>:
⇧P = p¯(V + fX + Y )  Y  X
⇧D =  p¯(V + fX + Y )
In equilibrium:
@⇧P
@X
= 0) (Y + V + fX)px + pf   1 = 0
@⇧D
@Y
= 0)  (V + fX + Y )py   p = 0
@2⇧P
@X2
< 0) (Y + V + fX)pxx + 2pxf < 0
@2⇧D
@Y 2
< 0)  (V + fX + Y )pyy   2py < 0
Given AS1:
@2⇧P
@X@f
= Xpx + p > 0
@2⇧D
@Y @f
=  Xpy > 0
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@2⇧P
@X@Y
= (V + fX + Y )pxy + px + fpy =   @
2⇧D
@Y @X
The goal is now to find and to study the signs of dXdf ,
dY
df and
d(X+Y )
df . By
doing so, it is possible to understand the eﬀect on each litigant’s expen-
ditures and on total legal costs of moving from the One-way favouring
Defendant Rule to the English Rule (i.e. the eﬀects on X , Y and X +Y
of an increase in f). Accordingly, the eﬀects of moving from the En-
glish Rule to the One-way favouring Defendant Rule (that are the ones
relevant for this chapter’s policy advises) can be derived.
Totally diﬀerentiating first order conditions with respect to f gives:
8>><>>:
dX
df
@2⇧P
@X2 +
dY
df
@2⇧P
@X@Y +
@2⇧P
@X@f = 0
dX
df
@2⇧D
@Y @X +
dY
df
@2⇧D
@Y 2 +
@2⇧D
@Y @f = 0
Solving this system gives:
dX
df
=
@2⇧D
@Y @f
@2⇧P
@X@Y   @
2⇧P
@X@f
@2⇧D
@Y 2
@2⇧D
@Y 2
@2⇧P
@X2   @
2⇧D
@Y @X
@2⇧P
@X@Y
dY
df
=
 @2⇧D@Y @f @
2⇧D
@X2   @
2⇧P
@X@f
@2⇧P
@X@Y
@2⇧D
@Y 2
@2⇧P
@X2   @
2⇧D
@Y @X
@2⇧P
@X@Y
Proposition 3: By moving from the One-way favouring defendant sys-
92 CHAPTER 3. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE ONE-WAY FEE-SHIFTING RULE
tem to the English one, while the eﬀect on the Defendant’s equilibrium
expenditure is uncertain, it is certain that the Plaintiﬀ increases her
equilibrium legal expenditure. Therefore, the disadvantaged party’s ex-
penditure always increases, while the favoured party’s expenditure can
either decrease or increase. The eﬀect on total legal expenditure (i.e. on
the dissipation of the case value) is then ambiguous and depends on the
specific form of the Plaintiﬀ’s winning probability function40.
dX
df
> 0,
dY
df
> or < 0
Where dYdf > or < 0 means that the sign of
dY
df cannot be determined.
Conversely, Proposition 3 implies that, when moving from the English
system to the One-Way favouring Defendant system, the Plaintiﬀ un-
doubtedly decreases her legal expenditure. The eﬀect on the Defendant’s
expenditure is not predictable; therefore the eﬀect on the total legal ex-
penditure is ambiguous. Intuitively, when the complete One-Way pro-
Defendant rule is implemented, the Plaintiﬀ’s expected value in winning
the case decreases: if the Plaintiﬀ wins, she gains only the contested
stake; under the English Rule, instead, she gains the stake and also gets
a reimbursement for legal expenditure. Moreover, under a complete One-
40See Appendix for proof.
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Way favouring Defendant system, the Plaintiﬀ does not discount each
additional unit of legal expenditure by the probability of winning and
being reimbursed; therefore the Plaintiﬀ’s expected marginal cost of le-
gal expenditure is higher with respect to the English rule. In sum, under
a complete pro-Defendant system, the Plaintiﬀ faces a lower expected
value in winning the case and a higher expected marginal cost of legal
expenditures than under the English Rule; this results in a drastic reduc-
tion in the Plaintiﬀ’s legal expenditures. On the other hand, when the
complete One-Way favouring Defendant Rule is adopted, the Defendant’s
expected value of winning the case and her legal expenditure’s marginal
cost do not change. Therefore, the Defendant’s expenditure can only be
aﬀected by the the Plaintiﬀ’s expenditure choices; this eﬀect cannot be
predicted. For instance, the Defendant can respond to a Plaintiﬀ’s ex-
penditures increase either by increasing her expenditures as well (as the
two choices were strategic complements) or by decreasing them by being
intimidated; hence, this ambiguity makes impossible to understand the
direction of total legal expenditure in the general model.
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Litigation Rate
To reach the litigation stage analysed so far, the Plaintiﬀ moves first
deciding whether to file the case or not41. If the Plaintiﬀ does not file the
case, she would get a payoﬀ of zero, otherwise, if the case is brought, the
Defendant decides wether to engage in the contest or not (hence loosing
the amount V ). In the subgame after the Plaintiﬀ decides to file the case,
the payoﬀ for the Defendant is  V if she does not engage the contest and
⇧D⇤42 if she files the case. Therefore, the Defendant chooses to accept to
litigate only if ⇧D⇤ >  V . Similarly, the Plaintiﬀ files the case only if
⇧P ⇤ > 0. In other words, ⇧D⇤ >  V and ⇧P ⇤ > 0 are the participation
constraints respectively for the Defendant and for the Plaintiﬀ. To sum
up, the higher ⇧P ⇤ and ⇧D⇤, the more litigants are willing to engage in
litigation and the higher the litigation rate is. As a matter of fact the
higher ⇧D⇤ and ⇧P ⇤ the more likely is that the participation constraints
are satisfied.
Proposition 4: Moving from the One-way favouring defendant system
to the English one, the eﬀect on litigation rate depends on the eﬀect of
such a movement on total litigation costs. The litigation rate decreases if
41The settlement stage is not considered in this model.
42⇧D⇤ is the equilibrium return from litigation for the Defendant. ⇧P ⇤ is the equilibrium return from litigation
for the Plaintiﬀ.
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total litigation costs increase and vice-versa. The opposite is true when
moving from the English rule to the One-way favouring defendant rule.
⇧D⇤+⇧P ⇤ = p¯⇤(V+fX⇤+Y ⇤) Y ⇤ X⇤ p¯⇤(V+fX⇤+Y ⇤) =  X⇤ Y ⇤
When higher values of f increase total expenditures ((X⇤ + Y ⇤)), liti-
gants are more willing to engage in litigation (⇧D⇤ + ⇧P ⇤ increases).
The opposite is true when higher values of f decrease total expenditures
((X⇤ + Y ⇤)).
This Section has shown how the Plaintiﬀ’s legal expenditure and her
willingness to litigate are always higher under the English Rule than
under the One-way pro Defendant Rule. Moreover, it has been shown
that the litigation rate is always higher under the system providing the
lower total litigation costs. The general model does not permit to capture
the eﬀect on the Defendant’s litigation costs, and consequently on the
litigation rate and on total litigation costs of moving from the One-way
favouring defendant system to the English one. Therefore, the eﬀect of
the aforementioned shift on the legal system eﬃciency is ambiguous.
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3.4 Implications of results and ability gaps
In this chapter it has been shown how the characteristics of the One-way
fee-shifting Rule allow policymakers to influence the litigation process in
favour of one of the two parties. As a matter of fact, given the model’s
assumptions, it has been shown that the discouraging eﬀect of the pro-
Defendant Rule on the Plaintiﬀ decreases her probability of winning and
reduces her incentive to invest in legal expenditures and willingness to
engage in litigation. On the other hand, the Defendant is better oﬀ both
in terms of success probability and convenience to litigate43. Before pro-
ceeding, it is necessary to define more precisely the meaning of "ability".
In this context, ability refers to all those characteristics that enable one
party to increase her benefit (in terms of greater probability of victory) by
investing one unit of eﬀort. Thus, when the Plaintiﬀ is more able than the
Defendant, in order to have an equal probability of victory in the contest,
the Defendant must spend more than the Plaintiﬀ. In this chapter’s
model a possible diﬀerence in ability among parties is represented by the
general parameter A. Where if A > 1, the Plaintiﬀ is more able than the
Defendant, otherwise (0 < A < 1) the Defendant is more able than the
Plaintiﬀ.
43Is the extent to which the participation constraint is easily satisfiable.
3.4. IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS AND ABILITY GAPS 97
In the existing literature the exogenous parameter A > 0 is usually de-
noted by ⌘, and only represents the merit of the Plaintiﬀ’s complaint
in a particular case. Low values of ⌘ represent weak claims, while high
values represent strong claims. As a matter of fact, the higher the Plain-
tiﬀ’s merit the more the Plaintiﬀ has suﬃcient reasons or precedence in
law to make her case likely that it would be won. This chapter makes
the interpretation of the parameter (called A) more general. Despite the
fact that the merit of the case is one of the factor that surely aﬀects
A, diﬀerences in litigants abilities can be caused by many other factors.
Hereinafter some of these factors are suggested. Firstly, the monetary
wealth and the power (e.g. political influence) of the Plaintiﬀ vis-a’-vis
the Defendant plays an important role. The richer and more powerful
the Plaintiﬀ, the greater are the chances that she is able to secure better
legal representation to prove her case hence obtaining a higher return
from eﬀort, and thus more likely that A > 144. Secondly, ability could be
also aﬀected by the litigants’ willingness to support non-monetary costs
of litigation. As a matter of fact, litigation does not imply only monetary
cost, but also psychological costs (e.g. external pressure and stress) and
44Yoon (2009) shows how wealthier litigants have a higher return from legal representation and this, all things being
equal, increases the probability of a favourable legal outcome. Moreover, to assess the diﬀerences in the quality of legal
representation, Albert Yoon provided surveys to a random sample of 455 Article III judges asking their impressions
of the quality of the legal profession in civil cases. Among others, the interesting result is that Judges observed a
significant disparity in legal representation quality in litigation where an individual is usually matched against a more
powerful individual like a firm, an insurer or the government.
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professional costs (e.g. use of time to defend instead of working). Those
costs can be seen as opportunity costs45. The higher the Plaintiﬀ’s ability
to support human costs vis-a’-vis the Defendant, the higher the value of
A and vice versa. Finally, litigants could undertake illegal or unfair ac-
tivities in order to obtain a greater probability of success; this influences
relative ability as well. Therefore, in order to understand the direction
of A the claims merit has to be considered together with the combined
eﬀect of all the factors that may aﬀect the parameter. For instance, de-
spite the fact that the Defendant’s claim could have higher merit than
that of the Plaintiﬀ, A can be higher than 1. As a matter of fact, the
Plaintiﬀ may exploit her power and willingness to support human costs
in order to counterbalance the gap in merit, hence having a higher abil-
ity. Hence, following the model, a One-way favouring Defendant Rule
can be used when the policymakers recognise ex-ante that there exists a
positive diﬀerence in ability among the parties (i.e. A > 1) due reasons
other than the merit of the case (e.g. diﬀerences in wealth or power).
Intuitively, in cases where a litigant could benefit by taking advantage of
her greater economic capacity, power, or propensity for illegal activity, a
rule to discourage her participation in litigation proceeding and to reduce
45For instance, according to Walle (2013) litigations also result in opportunity costs: the time spent by Plaintiﬀs
and Defendants on collecting documents, conferring with counsel and preparing for litigation cannot be spent on more
productive activities.
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her chances of winning would seem justified. On the other hand, the use
of the rule would be unjustified in cases where the diﬀerence in ability
depends solely on the merits of the case. Why damage the litigant who
deserves most to win the case?
This chapter provides theoretical support to policies aimed at reducing
undesirable ability gaps between litigants and shows how these policies,
given the trade oﬀ between litigation rate and total litigation costs, do
not necessarily make the litigation system less eﬃcient. An example of
this kind of policy can be found in a recent bill introduced in the United
States House, the Saving High-tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Dis-
putes Act46. The aim of the Bill is to limit the excessive recourse to
litigation of non-practicing entities (NPEs’) 47, people or companies that
enforce patent rights against accused infringers in an attempt to collect li-
censing fees, without manufacturing products or supplying services based
upon such patents. Within the patent law community, there is a general
perception that NPEs’ use the high cost of litigation to gain an un-
fair advantage over potential defendants48. In recent decades, there have
been numerous cases where NPEs have gained windfall revenues from set-
46See The SHIELD Bill by Representatives Peter DeFazio and Jason Chaﬀetz. The text is available at
http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/SHIELD-Act-113th-final.pdf.
47Also known with the pejorative term "patent-trolls”.
48"According to a 2009 economic survey commissioned by the American Intellectual Property Law Association
(AIPLA), in patent infringement cases where the amount in dispute is between $1 million and $25 million, total
litigation costs average in excess of $3 million, roughly 60 percent of which is incurred during discovery. In cases
where the amount in dispute exceeds $25 million, average total litigation costs” WIPO Magazine (February 2010 V1).
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tlements with accused infringers, where litigation has been threatened,
but defendants presumable do not have the power to defend the law-
suit. This problem is particularly pronounced in the technology sector,
where patents are central to the structure of the market, and where small
risk averse start up firms do not have the capital to engage in expensive
litigation. This may further be of particular concern as such pervasive
litigation may have a negative externality on technological development.
Indeed, the Shield Act Bill tries to fix this issue by setting a “One-Way
favouring Defendant Rule” for this type of litigation: if the Plaintiﬀ loses
in court, then she pays the other side’s costs and legal fees; otherwise
each party pays her own fees. This should reduce NPEs’ incentive to
participate in litigations, while increasing the Defendant’s convenience
to litigate and her probability of winning the case.
One can easily imagine other applications of the One-Way fee-shifting
Rule. Firstly, it can be used to protect individuals in tort cases against
corporations. Corporations have, on average, a greater wealth and more
“power” than individuals. Thus, by applying the One-way favouring
Plaintiﬀ Rule (if the individual is the Plaintiﬀ), or the One-Way favouring
Defendant Rule (if the individual is the Defendant), it would be possible
to reduce this ability gap, balancing the benefits that the corporation
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draws from the burdens of litigation costs. Secondly, the rule can be
used to limit the so-called “intimidation lawsuits” where agents start le-
gal actions in order to deter journalists from pursuing investigation about
them. The Plaintiﬀ is generally a powerful agent that can easily support
the legal and human costs of a dispute, even if the case merit is extremely
low.
To sum up, there exist many contexts in which favouring one of the two
litigants seems to be desirable. Ability gaps may be reduced, and the legal
system can even become more eﬃcient (i.e by reducing certain types of
frivolous recourse to litigation). The One-way fee-shifting Rule is the only
fee-shifting system that can be used not only to influence legal system
eﬃciency, but to reduce the eﬀects of litigants’ gap on the litigation
outcome. As a matter of fact, it is the only rule where the most able
litigant can face a lower probability of success49. Of course in applying
the One-way fee-shifting system the policymaker should also consider the
implications on legal system eﬃciency, so the trade oﬀ between litigation
costs and litigation rate.
49This eﬀect of the rule is higher the closer we get to a complete One-way pro-Defendant rule.
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3.5 Conclusion
By using and applying a general rent-seeking model, this chapter has
demonstrated how, unlike the English Rule (and the American Rule as
well) the One-way fee-shifting Rule can reduce the eﬀects on litigation
outcome of ability gaps between litigants. As a matter of fact, the One-
Way fee-shifting Rule discourages one of the two litigants by decreasing
her probability of success independently of her ability. Under a loser-
pay system, the litigant with the highest ability always has a higher
probability of winning at trial than the other; this is not necessarily true
under a One-Way fee-shifting system. For instance, by applying a pro-
Defendant Rule, the Plaintiﬀ may face a lower probability of winning
at trial even if she is more able than the Defendant, and vice versa for
the pro-Plaintiﬀ case. This result is exacerbated the closer the rule is to
a complete One-Way fee-shifting Rule. As a result, when moving from
the English rule to the One-way fee-shifting one, the discouraged litigant
is always worse oﬀ in terms of probability of success and is thus less
willing to engage in litigation and to exert eﬀort. This features may allow
policymakers to use a One-Way fee-shifting system when they recognise
ex-ante that there exists a diﬀerence in ability among the parties due to
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reasons diﬀerent than the merit of the case (e.g. diﬀerences in wealth or
power). This chapter has also considered the implications of moving from
an English system to a One-way fee-shifting system on total litigation cost
and litigation rate. Despite the fact that this eﬀect is ambiguous, a trade
oﬀ between litigation rate and litigation costs has been found and this
has to be considered by policymakers in choosing whether to adopt the
One-Way fee-shifting rule.
In summary, an economic analysis of the One-way fee-shifting rule
and of its possible application as well has been provided. Future works
should consider some possible complications in the model. For example,
the ability can be considered as endogenous parameter and the presence
of asymmetric informations between litigants can also be included. More-
over, empirical evidence could be used to test the propositions set out in
this chapter.
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3.6 Appendix
A) Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1:
(2) can be rewritten as:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
X < Y if f > 1 pp
X = Y if f = 1 pp
X > Y if f < 1 pp
(3)
In order to satisfy condition (3) and the Assumption 3 it is true that:
• If A = 1:
8>><>>:
X = Y when f = 1
X < Y otherwise
(a)
When the litigants have the same ability and spend the same amount
(i.e. A = 1 and X = Y ), given Assumption 3, they must have the same
probability of prevailing at trial (i.e. p = 1/2). To satisfy (3), f must
then be equal to 150. By the same reasoning, when A = 1 and X < Y ,
the Defendant has a higher probability of winning at trial (i.e p < 1/2)
50f =
1  12
1
2
= 1.
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then, to satisfy (3), f must be lower than one. Finally, since f can’t be
higher than one, it is impossible to have A = 1 and Y < X .
• If A > 1
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
X > Y when f >
1 2S
1+2S
X = Y when f =
1 2S
1+2S
X < Y when f <
1 2S
1+2S
(b)
When the litigants spend the same amount and the Plaintiﬀ is more
able than the Defendant (i.e A > 1 and X = Y ), given Assumption
3, the Plaintiﬀ must have an higher probability of winning at trial (i.e.
p = 1/2 + S > 12 , with 0 < S < 1/2). The higher the Plaintiﬀ’s ability,
the higher her probability of winning at trial (i.e. the higher A, the
higher S). To satisfy (3), f must then be equal to 1 2S1+2S
51. By the same
reasoning, the cases in which X > Y and Y < X can be explained.
• IfA < 1
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
X > Y when f >
1+2S
1 2S impossible
X = Y when f =
1+2S
1 2S impossible
X < Y when f <
1+2S
1 2S
=)X < Y , 8f (c)
This is derived by the same reasoning as the previous cases. Since 1+2S1 2S
is higher than 1, and f 2[0, 1], when A < 1, the Defendant always spends
51f =
1 ( 12+S)
1
2+S
< 1, since 0 < p < 1, 0 < S < 12 .
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more than the Plaintiﬀ.
Step 2:
Now, fixing f = 1, f = 0 or 0 < f < 1 the first, the second and the third
part of Proposition 1 are respectively reached.
For instance, when 0 < f < 1:
• X < Y ifA < 1
• X < Y if A = 1
•
8>>>>><>>>>>:
X < Y if A < Aˆ
X = Y if A = Aˆ
X > Y if A > Aˆ
When the Defendant is more able than the Plaintiﬀ, or when they have
the same ability, the Defendant always spends more than the Plaintiﬀ,
otherwise conditions (a) and (c) wouldn’t be satisfied. When instead the
Plaintiﬀ is more able than the Defendant, the latter spends more only for
all the levels of ability which are compensated by f , then for all A < Aˆ.
When instead A = Aˆ, X becomes equal to Y . Finally, for all the A > Aˆ,
the Plaintiﬀ spends more than the Defendant, otherwise condition (b)
wouldn’t be satisfied.
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The lower is f , the higher is S and consequently the higher is Aˆ. There-
fore, the closer f is to f = 0 (i.e. when the rule tends to a complete
pro-Defendant rule) the more the Defendant is favoured by the rule (i.e.
the higher is the defendant’s ability deficit which is compensated by the
rule)
B) Proof of Proposition 3
Here it is shown that:
dX
df
> 0,
dY
df
7 0
Defining:
g =
@2⇧D
@Y 2
@2⇧P
@X2
  @
2⇧D
@Y @X
@2⇧P
@X@Y
Since
@2⇧D
@Y 2
,
@2⇧P
@X2
< 0 and
@2⇧D
@Y @X
=   @
2⇧P
@X@Y
g is always positive.
By totally diﬀerentiating the FOCs with respect to V dXdV and
dY
dV are
found. By substitution and following Assumption 6 it can then ben
written:
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dX
dV
=
( py)( @2⇧P@X@Y ) + ( px)(@
2⇧PD
@Y 2 )
g
> 0
dY
dV
=
(py)(
@2⇧P
@X2 ) + ( px)( @
2⇧P
@X@Y )
g
> 0
Since g is always positive it follows that
( py)( @
2⇧P
@X@Y
)+( px)(@
2⇧D
@Y 2
) > 0and(py)(
@2⇧P
@X2
)+( px)( @
2⇧P
@X@Y
) > 0
For simplicity:
( py)( @
2⇧P
@X@Y
) + ( px)(@
2⇧D
@Y 2
) = L
(py)(
@2⇧P
@X2
) + ( px)( @
2⇧P
@X@Y
) = N
Then:
dX
dV
=
L
g
> 0
dY
dV
=
N
g
> 0
Now given Section 3.3.1 derivatives it is known that
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dX
df
=
( pyX)( @2⇧P@X@Y ) + ( pxX   p)@
2⇧D
@Y 2
g
By substitution this can be rewritten as
dX
df
=
X[L]  p@2⇧D@Y 2
g
Since
X,L, p@
2⇧D
@Y 2
> 0
Then
dX
df
> 0
By the same reasoning:
dY
df
=
X[N ]  p @2⇧P@X@Y
g
Therefore, the sign of dYdf depends on the sign of
@2⇧D
@X@Y which is am-
biguous.
Then:
dY
df
7 0
dY
df can be either higher or lower than 0.
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C) American Rule
In this appendix the American Rule is briefly added to the chapter anal-
ysis. In particular it is shown how, like the English Rule, the American
Rule cannot be used for reducing the eﬀect on litigation outcome of ’abil-
ity gaps’ between litigants. Moreover, the eﬀects on the litigation rate
and on litigants’ behaviour of moving from the American Rule to the
One-Way Fee-shifting Rule is explored.
In order to account for the American Rule the expected return functions
in the original model are modified such that52:
8>><>>:
⇧P = p¯(V + bY )  bY  X
⇧D =  p¯(V + bY )  Y (1  b)
Now, if b = 0, the American Rule applies: each party has to pay her
litigation costs. If b = 1, a complete One-way fee-shifting pro-Defendant
Rule applies: the Defendant can always recover fees, while the Plaintiﬀ
cannot. Solving the usual first order conditions:
@⇧P
@X
= 0) (V + bY )px   1 = 0
52The assumptions remain the same as in Section 3.1.
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@⇧D
@Y
= 0)  (V + bY )py   pb  (1  b) = 0
It can then be written:
(V + bY )px   1 = 0 =  (V + bY )py   pb  (1  b)
After some computations the following condition which holds in equilib-
rium is obtained:
px + py
px
= b(1  p)
Given the model assumptions, it follows that when the American Rule
is applied (i.e. b = 0) the two litigants always spend the same amount.
In fact, px+pypx = 0 only if X = Y . Therefore, when the American Rule
is applied the litigant with the highest ability has always a higher prob-
ability of winning at trial. Under the complete One-way pro-Defendant
fee-shifting Rule (i.e. b = 1) instead, the Defendant always spends more
than the Plaintiﬀ and hence the Defendant can have a higher probability
of winning at trial even when she is less able than the Plaintiﬀ. Like
the English Rule, the American Rule cannot then be used for reducing
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the eﬀect of litigants’ ability gaps on the litigation process. To sum up,
the One-Way fee-shifting Rule can be used as an instrument for equality
policies both in countries where the default rule is the English Rule or in
countries where the default rule is the American one.
Following the familiar process used in Section 3.3 of the Chapter and
Braeutigam et al. (1984) , it can also be shown that moving from the
American Rule to the One-Way fee-shifting Rule while the litigation rate
decreases, total legal expenditure always increases. Therefore the trade-
oﬀ between litigation costs and the litigation rate is confirmed and should
be considered by the policymaker when deciding on whether to apply or
not the One-Way fee-shifting Rule.
Chapter 4
The One-way Fee-shifting Rule eﬀects
on total litigation expenditures and
the litigation rate
OVERVIEW
Chapter 3 provided a theoretical framework which accounts for all of the
characteristics of the One-way fee-shifting Rule and that allows for com-
parison with the more common English Rule. The Chapter has demon-
strated how the One-Way Fee-Shifting Rule incentivises the favoured lit-
igant to exert more eﬀort than the disadvantaged one and this increases
the favoured litigant’s probability of winning at trial. However, the gen-
eral model did not permit to capture the eﬀects of a movement from
the English Rule to a rule favouring one of the two parties on litigants’
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total legal expenditure and on the litigation rate as well. Therefore, this
Chapter solves the general model by the use of specific Tullock’s success
probability functions with decreasing returns from legal expenditures to
show how, a movement from the English Rule to a rule favouring one
of the two parties always decreases total legal expenditures and always
increases the litigation rate. This trade-oﬀ must be considered when
deciding wether to apply the rule or not.
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4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 introduced a general economic model for showing how the One-
Way Fee-Shifting Rule increases the favoured litigant eﬀort and proba-
bility of winning at trial1. However, the eﬀect on litigants’ total legal
expenditure and on the litigation rate of a movement from the English
Rule to a rule favouring one of the two parties is ambiguous and cannot be
derived looking at the general model. In particular, PropositionS 3 and 4
of Chapter 3 explain how the eﬀect of the aforementioned movement on
total litigation costs and on litigation rate depends on the specific form
of the Plaintiﬀ’s winning probability function in the model.
For instance, under a complete pro-Defendant system, the Plaintiﬀ faces a
lower expected value in winning the case and a higher expected marginal
cost of legal expenditures than under the English Rule; this results in a
reduction in the Plaintiﬀ’s legal expenditures. On the other hand, when
the complete One-Way favouring Defendant Rule is adopted, the Defen-
dant’s expected value of winning the case and her legal expenditure’s
marginal cost do not change. Therefore, the Defendant’s expenditure
can only be aﬀected by the the Plaintiﬀ’s expenditure choices; this eﬀect
cannot be predicted. For instance, the Defendant can respond to a Plain-
1See Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 of Chapter 3.
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tiﬀ’s expenditures increase either by increasing her expenditures as well
(as the two choices were strategic complements) or by decreasing them
by being intimidated.
However, following the aforementioned reasonings, it is reasonable to
expect that the eﬀect on the Plaintiﬀ’s expenditure is much higher than
the eﬀect on the Defendant’s one (which is aﬀected only by Plaintiﬀ’s
expenditure). This should result in lower total costs of litigation when
moving from the English system to the complete pro-Defendant one.
Hypothesis 1: Moving from the One-way Favouring Defendant system
to the English one, the total legal expenditure always increases.
The same reasonings apply for the partial One-Way pro-Defendant Rule.
The closer we get to a complete One-Way pro-Defendant Rule, the more
intense are the aforementioned trade-oﬀs.
Moreover, since higher litigation costs result in a lower litigation rate2,
following Hypothesis 1 it is then reasonable to expect that overall the
litigation rate decreases when moving from the One-way favouring de-
fendant system to the English one.
2See Chapter 3.
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Hypothesis 2: Moving from the One-way Favouring Defendant system
to the English one, the litigation rate decreases, and vice-versa moving
from the English rule to the One-way Favouring Defendant rule.
Intuitively, a shift from the One-way favouring Defendant system to the
English system makes the Defendant (the Plaintiﬀ) less (more) willing to
engage in litigation. Conversely, a shift from the English system to the
One-way Favouring Defendant one makes the Plaintiﬀ (the Defendant)
less (more) willing to engage in litigation. As a matter of fact, when
the One-Way fee-shifting Rule favouring Defendant is implemented, the
Defendant’s expected cost of losing the case dramatically decreases. For
instance, under the complete One-Way pro-Defendant Rule a losing De-
fendant bears only her own costs; under the English Rule instead, she
bears the Plaintiﬀ’s cost as well. Therefore, the Defendant is more willing
to engage in litigation. On the other hand, the Plaintiﬀ’s expected cost
of losing the case doesn’t change with the application of a pro-Defendant
system. However, the Plaintiﬀ should be less willing to engage in litiga-
tion because she knows that the Defendant is now more willing to litigate.
It is reasonable to expect that the positive eﬀect on the Defendant’s will-
ingness to engage in litigation is much higher than the negative eﬀect on
the Plaintiﬀ ’s willingness to engage in litigation. This results in higher
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litigation rate when moving from the English system to the complete
One-way pro-Defendant one. The same reasonings apply for the partial
One-way pro-Defendant Rule. The closer we get to a complete One-way
pro-defendant Rule the more exacerbated are the aforementioned impli-
cations.
Therefore, two hypothesis have been set. First, the dissipation of the
value of a case through litigation3 is likely to be higher under the En-
glish Rule than under the One-way fee-shifting Rule. This should be true
given the dramatic eﬀect of the One-Way fee shifting system on the dis-
advantaged party’s expenditures4. Second, the English Rule reduces the
litigation rate: it is more diﬃcult to satisfy the participation constraints
under the English Rule than under the One-way fee-shifting Ruke. To
sum up, it has been hypothesised that the One-way favouring Defendant
system provides a greater incentive for parties to sue than the English
system which entails higher equilibrium legal expenditures. This result
fits with the trade oﬀ between legal expenditures and litigation rate found
in previous literature comparing the English and the American rules5.
In the next section, the model introduced in Chapter 3 is solved using
3Total legal costs.
4For example moving from the English system to the favouring Defendant one dramatically decreases the Plaintiﬀ’s
expenditures; this eﬀect is expected to be higher than the eﬀect on Defendant’s expenditures, so total expenditures
decrease.
5See Chapter 3 literature review.
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Tullock’s success probability functions with decreasing returns to legal
expenditures. This permits to show how the Propositions that have been
reached in Chapter 3 are confirmed in this setting and, most importantly,
to test the two Hypothesis set in this Chapter.
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4.2 Chapter 3 Propositions and Hypothesis
Testing
This Chapter starts from the general model introduced by Chapter 3.
Therefore, a sequential two-player litigation game, where each risk neu-
tral player selects her level of eﬀort (X for the Plaintiﬀ P and Y for
the Defendant D) in order to win a case, it is considered. The value of
the contested case (V ) is assumed to be fixed (i.e. the dispute is not on
the amount in question) and is not aﬀected positively or negatively by
the parties’ expenditures. Each litigant can increase her probability of
winning the case by undertaking a higher litigation eﬀort (i.e. increasing
legal expenditures).
Litigants expected returns from litigations are:8<:⇧P = p¯(V   (1  f)X) + (1  p¯)( Y  X)⇧D = (1  p¯)(0) + p¯( V   fX   Y )
Where:
• p¯ ⌘ p(X, Y,A) 2(0, 1) is the probability that the Plaintiﬀ wins the
case. This probability depends on litigants’ expenditures and on the
ability A. 1  p¯ is then the probability that the Defendant wins the
case.
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• f2[0, 1] is the fraction of Plaintiﬀ’s litigation costs X that the Plain-
tiﬀ can recover in the event of victory. Of course, 1 f is the fraction
of Plaintiﬀ’s litigation costs X that the Plaintiﬀ can’t recover in the
event of victory. The Defendant always fully recovers her fees in case
of victory. If f = 1, the English Rule applies: the loser is required to
bear all of the winner’s legal expenses. If f = 0 the complete One-
way fee-shifting pro-Defendant Rule applies: the Defendant is always
able to recover fees, while the Plaintiﬀ cannot. For 0 < f < 1, the
Plaintiﬀ can recover only a fraction of her fees and hence a hybrid
rule which lies in between the English Rule and the complete One-
way pro-Defendant Rule applies. The lower the value of f , the more
the Defendant is favoured by the rule and hence, the closer the rule
is to a Complete One-way pro-Defendant system.
In this section this general model is solved by using a specific form for
the litigants success probability functions p and 1   p¯. Katz (1987) of-
fered as a possible formulation of litigation success functions the Tullock’s
function where success depends on the ratio of the litigants respective ex-
penditures. Namely, the probability that the Plaintiﬀ wins is p = ⌘X⌘X+Y
where X and Y are the legal expenditures for the Plaintiﬀ and for the
Defendant respectively, and ⌘   0 is the merit of the Plaintiﬀ’s claim in
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a particular case. Farmer and Pecorino (1999) added to this specifica-
tion the legal technology parameter r which allows for diﬀerent returns
to scale from expenditures in litigation, so p = ⌘X
r
⌘Xr+Y r where a positive
(negative) value of r identifies increasing (decreasing) returns to scale6.
This specification has been exploited in the majority of literature on the
economic analysis of fee-shifting systems. Despite this fact, this success
probability function has never been applied in the analysis of the One-way
fee-shifting Rule.
This chapter contributes to the literature by solving the general model
using Pecorino and Farmer probability functions. The only exception is
that ability A is used instead of merit ⌘.
Moreover, it is assumed that r < 1 (i.e. decreasing returns from legal
expenditures). In most civil litigation cases, it is reasonable to expect
that a litigant’s increase in the amount invested in legal expenditures
is much more productive (in terms of gaining a higher probability of
winning a trial) when legal expenditures are low. As a matter of fact the
lower are the legal expenditures the lower is the amount of relevant pieces
of evidence that the litigant has been already brought to court to show
her reasons. The first pieces of evidence are usually the most relevant
for the case. Furthermore, for simplicity it is assumed that r = 1/4; as
6Litigants have access to the same legal technology.
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a matter of fact a Nash equilibrium with f = 1 does not exist under
the English rule if r   1 (See Carbonara et al. (2015)) and assigning a
precise numerical value to r permits to reach closed form solutions when
solving the model.
The probability function p = AX
1
4
AX
1
4+Y
1
4
satisfies all the assumptions
that have been made in Chapter 3; indeed solving the model derives
results consistent with the Chapter’s 3 propositions and permits to test
the hypothesis made in this Chapter.
Litigant’s expected returns from litigation can be rewritten as:
8>><>>:
⇧P = AX
1
4
AX
1
4+Y
1
4
(V + fX + Y )  Y  X
⇧D =   AX 14
AX
1
4+Y
1
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= 0) 4A
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A 4
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@Y
= 0)  
A 4
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X
⇣
4A 4
p
XY 3/4   fX   V + 3Y
⌘
4Y 3/4
⇣
A 4
p
X + 4
p
Y
⌘2 = 0
The first order conditions system cannot be explicitly solved. Therefore,
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in order to analyse the equilibrium of the game, numerical solutions are
provided7. In particular, it will be shown how numerical solutions are
consistent with each of the chapter’s propositions and hypothesis.
4.2.1 Proposition 1
Graphs [1], [2], [3] and [4] show the equilibrium values of X and Y for
each value of A8 under the diﬀerent fee-shifting systems described in the
previous Sections. For simplicity of illustration only the cases of f =
0, 5 and f = 0.7 are considered for the Partial One-Way pro-Defendant
rule. The x-axis denotes the ability parameter A, and the y-axis denotes
the level of equilibrium expenditure. Therefore, the continuous and the
dashed curves represent the equilibrium expenditures for the Plaintiﬀ and
for the Defendant respectively.
Graph [1] shows the English Rule case and confirms that when f = 1 the
litigant with the highest ability always spends more than the other one;
if instead the litigants have the same ability they will spend the same
amount in equilibrium. As a matter of fact, the dashed curve is above
(below) the continuous one when A < 1 (A > 1), and the two curves
cross at A = 1.
7Numerical solutions have been obtained simulating the model by the use of Wolfram Mathematica.
8Note that while parameter A tends to infinity, the analysis presented here considers 0 < A < 9 for the purpose
of illustration.
4.2. CHAPTER 3 PROPOSITIONS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING 125
Graph [1]
Graph [2] shows instead the Complete One-Way pro-Defendant fee-shifting
Rule case. When f = 0 the Defendant always spends more than the
Plaintiﬀ. As a matter of fact the dashed curve is always above the con-
tinuous one. As A!1, X ! Y .
Graph [2]
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Finally, the last two Graphs show the Partial One-Way pro-Defendant
Rule case. The Defendant’s portion of recoverable costs is 50% in Graph
[3] and 70% in Graph [4]. When 0 < f < 1, the Defendant spends more
than the Plaintiﬀ both when the litigants have the same ability and when
the Defendant is more able than the Plaintiﬀ. When instead the Plaintiﬀ
is more able than the Defendant, the latter spends more only up to a
certain level of ability, Aˆ > 1. At this point, the litigants spend the same
amount, but beyond it the Plaintiﬀ spends more than the Defendant. As
a matter of fact, when f = 0, 5 the dashed curve is above (below) the
continuous one when A < 2 (A > 2), and the two curves cross at A = 2.
When instead f = 0, 7 the dashed curve is above (below) the continuous
one when A < 1, 4 (A > 1, 4), and the two curves cross at A = 1, 4.
Therefore, comparing the case of f = 0, 5 (Graph [3]), and the case of
f = 0.7 (Graph [4]), it is observed that the lower the value of f , the
higher is the value of Aˆ: 2 > 1, 4.
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Graph [3]
Graph [4]
4.2.2 Proposition 2
Graph [5] shows the Plaintiﬀ’s equilibrium probability of winning at trial
for each value of A under the diﬀerent fee-shifting systems described in
the previous Sections. The x-axis denotes the ability parameter A, and
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the y-axis denotes the Plaintiﬀ’s equilibrium probability of success p.
The lower the value of f (i.e. the closer to a Complete One-Way pro-
Defendant Rule), the lower is the Plaintiﬀ’s equilibrium probability of
success. As a matter of fact, the curve for f = 1 is always above the one
for f = 0. The curves for f = 0, 7 is above the f = 0, 5 curve and they
are in between the f = 1 and f = 0 curves. All the curves monotonically
increase as A increases.
The f = 1 curve exceeds p = 0, 5 at A = 1, thus when the English
Rule is applied the litigant with the highest ability always has a higher
probability of winning at trial. The curve for f = 0 instead, exceeds p =
0, 5 at A = 1, 2. Therefore, when the Complete One-way pro-Defendant
Rule is applied, there is a range (1 < A < 1, 2) in which a less able
Defendant has a greater chance to win than the Plaintiﬀ. The Partial
One-Way pro Defendant Rule also allows for a range in which a less
able Defendant has a grater probability of success than the Plaintiﬀ, but
this range is smaller than the one provided by the Complete One-way
pro-Defendant Rule ( 1 < A < 1.1 for f = 0, 5 and 1 < A < 1.08
for f = 0, 7). Therefore, the closer the rule is to a Complete One-Way
fee-shifting System the higher is the counterbalancing eﬀect on ability
gaps.
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4.2.3 Proposition 3 and Hypothesis 1 Testing
Graph [6] (Graph [7]) shows the equilibrium values of X (Y ) for each
value of A under the diﬀerent fee-shifting systems described in the previ-
ous Sections. The x-axis denotes the ability parameter A, and the y-axis
denotes the level of equilibrium expenditure. When moving from the
One-way favouring defendant system to the English one (i.e when the
parameter f goes from 0 to 1), while the eﬀect on Defendant equilib-
rium expenditure is uncertain, it is certain that the Plaintiﬀ increases
her equilibrium legal expenditure. As a matter of fact in Graph [6], the
f = 1 curves is always above the other curves; the curves for f = 0, 7 is
above the f = 0, 5 curve and they lie in between the f = 1 and f = 0
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curves. Graph [7] shows instead that Y can either decrease or decrease
with f depending on A. Total equilibrium expenditure (i.e. X⇤ + Y ⇤)
always increases with f . As a matter of fact in Graph [8], representing
the total expenditure for each value of A under diﬀerent rules, the f = 1
curves is always above the other curves; the curves for f = 0, 7 is above
the f = 0, 5 curve and they lie in between the f = 1 and f = 0 curves.
Hypothesis 1 is verified, meaning that the certain eﬀect on the Plain-
tiﬀ’s legal expenditure is always higher than the uncertain eﬀect on the
Defendant’s legal expenditure.
Graph [6]
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Graph [8]
4.2.4 Proposition 4 and Hypothesis 2 Testing
Moving from the One-way favouring defendant system to the English one,
the litigation rate decreases. As a matter of fact, ⇧D⇤+⇧D⇤ =  X⇤ Y ⇤
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decreases with f . This is clear looking at Graph [8]. Since X⇤ + Y ⇤
increases with f , the inverse is true for  X⇤   Y ⇤. Moreover, Graph [9]
shows that when f goes from 0 to 1 the reduction in Defendant willingness
to litigate is higher than the rise in Plaintiﬀ willingness to litigate, and
this is why the overall eﬀect on litigation rate is negative. Hypothesis 2
is verified. The x-axis denotes the ability parameter A, and the y-axis
denotes the return from litigations for the Plaintiﬀ and for the Defendant.
The analysis is similar to the one done for previous Graphs. Note that
the distance among grey curves is greater than the distance among black
curves.
Graph [9]
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For the purpose of completeness, the higher is the value of the parameter
r the greater is the marginal return from legal expenditures for both
the Plaintiﬀ and the Defendant. This means that the eﬀect of legal
expenditures on the litigation process increases with r. Therefore, it is
reasonable to expect that the eﬀect of a change in the fee-shifting system
on litigants’ behaviour is greater the higher is the marginal return from
legal expenditures. For instance, when the parameter r is equal to 0, 5
the range in which a less able Defendant has a greater chance to win
than the Plaintiﬀ increases with respect to the case in which r = 0, 25
(1 < A < 1, 2 for r = 0, 25 and 1 < A < 1, 4 for r = 0, 5) under a
complete One-way favouring Defendant fee-shifting Rule. By the same
reasonings, the higher the value of r the grater are total litigation costs
and litigation rate under each fee-shifting rule. This is mathematically
verifiable by solving the model with 0, 25 < r < 1 and by analysing the
equilibria.
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4.2.5 A final note
First, it has been assumed that litigants’ returns from legal expendi-
tures (in terms of higher probability of winning at trial) are decreasing.
Therefore, all real world cases where each litigant’s initial expenditures
are more eﬀective than subsequent expenditures fully fit with the analy-
sis. That is, cases where each litigant knows the ideal steps to follow for
supporting her rights and knows how each step could contribute to the
increase of her probability of winning at trial are, de facto, cases with
decreasing return to legal expenditures: the formal investigation under-
taken by both litigants (the discovery phase) follows precise and ordered
steps. The most common types of civil cases such as contracts, tort, com-
plaints against the government and property disputes most likely satisfy
the aforementioned characteristics. As a matter of fact, for those cases,
lawyers usually know what are the pieces of evidence (e.g. documents,
recording and interrogatories) needed to prove their clients’ rights and
thus know where and how to invest resources (i.e. starting from most
eﬀective discoveries). Of course, when cases are complex and lawyers
need several attempts (and many of the attempts could be useless in pro-
viding pieces of evidence) to understand how to organise the discovery
phase, returns from legal expenditures may be increasing; however, this
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seems more plausible for criminal cases. Second, the positive eﬀect of
each litigant’s legal expenditures on her probability of winning at trial is
increasing in her ability. This assumption, as shown in Chapter 3 (Sec-
tion 3.4) is reasonable for most types of civil cases and several examples
have been provided.
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4.3 Conclusion
The general model has been solved using Tullock’s success functions. Re-
sults are consistent with each of the third chapter’s proposition. More-
over, this chapter’s hypothesis has been successfully tested. The One-
Way Fee-Shifting Rule incentivises the favoured litigant to exert more
eﬀort than the disadvantaged one and this increases the favoured liti-
gant’s probability of winning at trial. Moreover, a movement from the
English Rule to a rule favouring one of the two parties always decreases
total legal expenditures and always increases the litigation rate. There-
fore, the rule can be used for reducing ability gaps between litigants and
this may also increase the overall litigation system eﬃciency (i.e. when
the benefit in terms of lower legal expenditure is higher that the cost
in term of higher litigation rate). Of course the magnitude of the trade
oﬀ between litigation costs and litigation rate is not captured by the
model and depends on several exogenous variables like the type of dis-
pute and the characteristics of litigants that must be evaluated by the
policy maker.
Chapter 5
The Favouring Plaintiﬀ Fee-Shifting
Rule: An Alternative to Legal Aid in
Financing Civil Litigation
OVERVIEW
This chapter aims to investigate whether (in Europe) the Favouring
Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule can be an alternative to legal aid for assist-
ing wealth-constrained Plaintiﬀs in pursuing cases, that would otherwise
be dropped. According to the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule, in
litigation a successful Plaintiﬀ is able to recover attorney’s fees, while a
successful Defendant is not. By means of a game theoretic model, it is
firstly shown that the rule, by reducing the Plaintiﬀ’s expected cost from
litigation, is eﬀective in facilitating the Plaintiﬀ’s access to Justice. Fur-
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thermore, under certain conditions it might also be more eﬀective than
legal aid. Moreover, it is shown how the litigation rate and the number
of settled cases are diﬀerently aﬀected by legal aid and by the Favour-
ing Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule. In particular, while legal aid increases the
litigation rate, the number of cases that are litigated rather than settled
always decreases under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule. Finally
it is briefly discussed how the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule could
be implemented from a policy perspective.
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5.1 Introduction
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, every citizen has the
right to counsel and the right to a fair trial in the determination of his
civil rights and obligations or in any criminal charge against him1. Those
who lack suﬃcient resources to support the cost of a trial have the right
to receive state-financed legal aid2. This principle is confirmed in the ma-
jority of the constitutions of European countries. For instance, Clause
24 of the Italian Constitution states: “Everyone is allowed to take legal
action for the protection of her/his rights and legitimate interests. De-
fence is an inviolable right at any grade of the proceedings. The means
of action and defence before all Courts are guaranteed to the indigent by
public institutions. The law determines the conditions and legal means
to remedy miscarriages of justice". Each country sets the conditions un-
der which a citizen can receive legal aid and the way in which legal aid
is provided3. The conditions for access to legal aid are generally set with
reference to financial resources and on the merit of the case4.Therefore,
1See Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2See Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
3For a detailed comparative study on legal aid in Europe see Barendrecht et al. (2014).
4In Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, a person has the right to free legal aid if two conditions are satisfied: 1) if he does not have
suﬃcient resources to pay for legal assistance (the means test) 2) when the interests of justice so require (the merits
test). Three factors should be taken into account when determining if the interests of justice is satisfied and then if
the case passes the merit test: the seriousness of the oﬀence and the severity of the potential sentence; the complexity
of the case; and the social and personal situation of the Defendant. Any one of the three factors can warrant the
need for the provision of legal aid (See Zaza and Marion (2014)). Both the "mean" and the "merit" test to determine
whether legal aid is provided or not can vary from country to country.
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one of the purposes of Legal aid (the one considered in this Chapter) is
to reduce the likelihood that potential Plaintiﬀs do not bring to justice
meritorious claims because of the presence of cost barriers. In fact, by
frustrating access to justice, cost barriers increase the incentive from peo-
ple to deviate from legal rules and can incentivise prospective litigants
to resolve conflicts out of the court system, potentially leading to unlaw-
ful conducts.5. This chapter considers the most common European “legal
aid system”, that is the proportional system, where the state provides the
litigant entitled to legal aid with at least a fraction of the trial expenses
she incurs6. In particular, when the merit requirements are fulfilled, the
fraction of the Plaintiﬀ’s own legal costs that is borne by the State is set
by the latter according to the former’s financial resources: the lower the
Plaintiﬀ’s resources, the higher the fraction of the Plaintiﬀ’s costs that
are reimbursed by the State. The maximum income allowing the benefi-
ciary of legal aid to receive full compensation usually corresponds to the
country poverty threshold, and thus is extremely low; higher thresholds
guarantee, instead, a partial compensation. For instance, as shown by
Barendrecht et al. (2014), in France the maximum monthly income for a
full coverage is e929; this amount rises to e1393 for a partial coverage
5This chapter investigates the issue of access to justice; therefore it is considered the case in which only the Plaintiﬀ
may be entitled to legal aid. In fact, the Defendant doesn’t face the choice of bringing a case to justice.
6Legal aid can also take the form of a fixed payment to the entitled litigant. For a more detailed discussion on
diﬀerent types of legal aid system in the European Union, see Lambert and Chappe (2014).
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which ranges from 15% to 100%. In the United Kingdom, instead, when
disposable income exceeds £315 (full coverage), the recipient has to pay
a financial contribution which is proportional to the exceeding amount.
Finally, other countries, such as Germany, Italy and Belgium, provide
only full coverage; however the recipient of legal aid may be required to
pay a fixed cost. Before proceeding, it must be noted that although legal
aid covers at least a fraction of the recipient’s own legal costs, legal aid
does not cover the costs the recipient is ordered to reimburse to her op-
ponent in the event of defeat7. Therefore, even if the Plaintiﬀ has been
granted legal aid, the Plaintiﬀ is not guaranteed to be free of financial
risk: if she looses the case, she has to pay 100% of her opponent’s lawyer
costs8. To sum up, legal aid is a way of financing civil litigation by public
spending with the goal of assisting people who cannot aﬀord legal costs
to bring a case to justice9.
Although legal aid is considered as an aspect of the European human
rights system, it increases public spending which is a major concern from
a budgetary perspective. Therefore, legal aid is under the threat of reduc-
tion and cutbacks (Tuil and Visscher, 2010). This threat contributed to
7In Europe, the loser in a lawsuit is typically required to bear at least a fraction of the winner’s legal costs.
8When the Plaintiﬀ has little or no money and therefore cannot pay her opponent’s costs, the court usually makes
a cost order against the Plaintiﬀ, which is not to be enforced until it can be shown that the Plaintiﬀ has the resources
to pay.
9Hereinafter the term “bringing a case to justice” refers to the notion of a case gaining credibility and hence gaining
the possibility of being either litigated or settled, rather than being dropped.
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the recent development of alternative instruments for financing civil liti-
gation and facilitating access to justice for wealth-constrained Plaintiﬀs.
Among the most discussed alternative instruments, are: legal expenses
insurances, third-party funding, and contingency or conditional fees. In
the case of legal insurance, a private insurer can cover the costs of litiga-
tion in exchange for a premium. Third party funding is instead a contract
between the Plaintiﬀ and a private party which pays at least part of the
Plaintiﬀ’s legal costs in exchange for a share of any judgment in favour
of the Plaintiﬀ. Finally, contingency/conditional fees provide that the
lawyer bears the litigant’s litigation costs in exchange for a judgment-
share/premium in the event of victory10. The law and economics litera-
ture on the analysis of the aforementioned instruments, and in particular
on their functioning and on the comparisons of their relative advantages
and drawbacks, is quite extensive and it is still developing based on the
contributions of both theoretical and empirical scholars11.
The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the literature on the com-
parison between legal aid and alternative mechanisms to facilitate access
to justice, by introducing the so-called "Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting
Rule"12 into the analysis. In the field of law and economics, fee-shifting
10For a more detailed analysis of legal insurance, third party funding, and conditional/contingency fees, see Heyes
et al. (2004), Kirstein and Rickman (2004) and Emons (2007).
11For a more compete overview of this literature, see Tuil and Visscher (2010).
12For simplicity hereinafter called "the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule".
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refers to the main legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil lit-
igation (mainly attorneys fees) between a Plaintiﬀ and a Defendant. In
lawsuits in the United States, a party always pays her own fees unless
otherwise specified by contract or statute (American Rule), while in Eu-
rope the loser is typically required to bear the winner’s legal expenses
(English Rule)13. However, a third type of rule can be applied where
fees are shifted in favour of only one party: the so-called One-way fee-
shifting Rule. Under this rule, one party recovers the attorneys’ fees in
the event of victory in trial whereas the other party (i.e. the disadvan-
taged one) cannot do so. Thus, if the Plaintiﬀ was the chosen beneficiary,
a successful Plaintiﬀ would recover the attorneys’ fees while a success-
ful Defendant would not (the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule). Since
this chapter analyses a mechanism to facilitate access to justice for wealth
constrained Plaintiﬀs, hereinafter only the Favouring Plaintiﬀ discussed.
As opposed to the American and the English Rules, the Favouring Plain-
tiﬀ fee-shifting Rule is the only rule where the two parties face diﬀerent
expected costs from litigation14. Intuitively, this significantly aﬀects the
decision on whether to bring a case to court or not, and in general, the
13For simplicity of analysis is only considered the extreme case case in which the English Rule requires the loosing
party to fully reimburse the winning party. However, as recently discussed by Carbonara et al. (2015), courts usually
impose a limit on recoverable litigation expenditures.
14In particular, while the Defendant always has to bear her litigation costs, the Plaintiﬀ pays her own litigation
costs only in the event of defeat.
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litigants’ choice between settlement and litigation. More specifically, due
to her ability to recover attorneys’ fees, the Plaintiﬀ should be more
willing to engage in litigation, have higher credibility to sue, and at-
tract a more favourable settlement. In contrast, the Defendant should
be deterred from litigation and should be incentivised to oﬀer a higher
settlement amount. These intuitions render the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule
a perfect candidate as an alternative to legal aid. In the United States, at
the state and federal levels, various statutes provide for this type of fee-
shifting system15, and consequently, in the United States, scholars drew
their attention on the economic and legal analysis of the rule (Krent
(1993), Rowe Jr and Anderson (1996), Wagener (2003) and Rosen-Zvi
(2009)). However, the rule has never been applied in Europe16.
By the use of a simple theoretical model and building on the existing
literature, this chapter demonstrates how the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-
shifting Rule could work in European countries (where the default is the
English Rule), and analyses whether it could be a viable alternative to
legal aid. The main result is that the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule can indeed
serve as an alternative to legal aid. In fact, similar to legal aid but
15For instance, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is a federal law which sets norms aimed at protecting consumers
in their transactions with lenders and creditors. Among other things, the Act provides that a One-Way fee-shifting
Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule is applied in litigation where a consumer sues a creditor that has violated one or more
consumer rights under the TILA (only the consumer can recover litigation costs). TILA can be found at 15 U.S.C.
1600 et. seq.. Moreover 15 U.S.C. also provides that successful Plaintiﬀs in private antitrust litigation are granted
an award of their attorneys’ fees.
16This assertion is according to my knowledge, and is subject to further research.
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with a diﬀerent magnitude, the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule adds
credibility to cases that would otherwise be dropped, hence making it
profitable for the Plaintiﬀ to bring these cases to justice. However, while
under legal aid some of the cases that have become credible are settled
and others are litigated (litigation rate increases), under the Favouring
Plaintiﬀ Rule, the cases that have become credible are instead always
settled. Furthermore, under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule, the litigation
rate decreases because it becomes more profitable for litigants to settle
some of the cases that would have been previously litigated. Finally, both
under legal aid and the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule, the bargained settlement
amount increases. The chapter concludes by showing when the Favouring
Plaintiﬀ Rule could be reasonably used17 to facilitate access to justice for
a wealth-constrained Plaintiﬀ, hence allowing the state to save public
resources which have become more limited since the financial crisis.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 briefly shows
the chapter’s related literature and the chapter’s contribution; Section 5.3
modifies a game theoretic model, introduced by Kirstein and Rickman
(2004), to analyse and compare the eﬀects on the Plaintiﬀ’s credibility
to sue and on the litigants’ choice between settlement and litigation, of
both legal aid and the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule; Section 5.4
17As an alternative to legal aid.
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concludes by providing policy implications and discussions on the results
achieved in the previous sections.
5.2. RELATED LITERATURE AND CONTRIBUTION 147
5.2 Related Literature and Contribution
This Chapter builds on the law and economic literature on litigation
and, in particular, on the branch of literature which analyses the eﬀects
of procedural arrangements on the Plaintiﬀ’s decision to bring a case to
justice and on the subsequent litigants’ decision on whether to settle or
to litigate the case18. In this regard, following Posner (1973b), Shavell
(1982) sets a simple game-theoretic model to analyze and compare diﬀer-
ent fee-shifting rules. The model is based on the hypothesis that rational
individuals may end up in litigation (as opposed to settling) because of
possible diﬀerences in their expectations about their relative probability
of winning the case19. Following this hypothesis, Kirstein and Rickman
(2004) slightly modified Shavell’s model in order to analyze third party
funding in Europe; they showed how these contracts eﬃciently increase
the Plaintiﬀ’s credibility of filing cases, as well as the settlement amount.
This Chapter slightly modifies Kirstein and Rickman’s model with the
aim of analyzing and comparing the eﬀects of legal aid and the Favouring
Plaintiﬀ Rule on the Plaintiﬀ’s credibility to sue, and on the litigants’
choice between litigation and settlement20. In fact, while there are var-
18The attention is not focused on the litigation process itself but on what happens before.
19See next Section for a more detailed explanation.
20Starting from the benchmark case where no instrument for financing civil litigation is applied.
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ious models which could facilitate such a comparison, the Kirstein and
Rickman framework seems to be the most appropriate due to its simplic-
ity and intuitive assumptions.
The Chapter results on the analysis of the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule are
indeed consistent with Shavell (1982): the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule al-
ways provides less litigation and adds more credibility to Plaintiﬀs’ cases
than the English Rule. On the other hand, there is no existing literature
which uses a game theoretic model to analyse legal aid; nevertheless, the
results on legal aid are quite intuitive and consistent with their under-
lying purpose21. However, the main contribution of this Chapter is not
the single economic analysis of legal aid and of the Favouring Plaintiﬀ
Rule, but rather their comparison. In fact, this is the first Chapter that
identifies the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule as a possible (and under certain
conditions, better) alternative to legal aid in assisting wealth-constrained
Plaintiﬀs’ access to justice. Therefore, this Chapter’s contribution con-
cerns the literature on access to justice and on the diﬀerent ways of
financing litigation.
The Chapter also sets a backdrop for discussions on the policy implica-
tions of alternative litigation funding mechanisms. The Favouring Plain-
tiﬀ Rule could indeed be used as an instrument for facilitating wealth-
21See the introduction.
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constrained Plaintiﬀs’ access to justice in Europe. While this provides
policymakers with a valid alternative to legal aid, it may lead to several
concerns that are briefly discussed at the end of the Chapter and that
further enlarge the literature debate on the topic.
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5.3 The Model
Following the literature based on the “divergent expectation” hypothe-
sis22, this Section presents a simple game theoretic model. The model
analyses and compares the eﬀects on the Plaintiﬀ’s credibility to sue and
on the litigants’ choice between settlement and litigation, of two distinct
mechanisms: legal aid and the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule23. By
reducing the expected litigation costs for the Plaintiﬀ, legal aid is de-
signed with the aim of favouring the access to justice for those Plaintiﬀs
that would not otherwise be able to bring their cases to justice. The
model shows how the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule can be used to pursue the
same goal in a diﬀerent way, and compares the two mechanisms. The
model considered in the analysis has been developed by Kirstein and
Rickman (2004). In order to fit the model with the Chapter aim, one of
the model specifications has been modified. Namely, while in the origi-
nal model both litigants costs are included into a single variable, in this
Chapter the Defendant’s and the Plaintiﬀ’s legal costs are considered
as two distinct variables. This permits to analyse the case in which a
successful Defendant has to bear her litigation costs (Favouring Plain-
tiﬀ Rule) and to account for the Plaintiﬀ’s obligation to reimburse the
22This hypothesis will be better explained later on in the analysis.
23The analysis refers to European countries, and hence the English Rule is the default fee-shifting rule.
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Defendant’s costs in the event of defeat under legal aid.
Before moving to the analysis and the comparison of legal aid and
of the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule (Subsections 5.3.2, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4), it is
shown how the Plaintiﬀ and the Defendant behave in the benchmark case,
where no mechanism for financing civil litigation is in place (Subsections
5.3.1).
5.3.1 The Benchmark Case
This section describes the benchmark case where no mechanism for fi-
nancing civil litigation is applied. The sequential litigation game is de-
scribed as follows:
A Plaintiﬀ (P ) has a claim (with a fixed value V ) against a Defendant
(D). Both litigants are assumed to be rational and risk-neutral. Before
the Plaintiﬀ decides whether to bring the case to the court or not, the
two litigants bargain over a settlement (s). For simplicity settlement
costs are normalised to zero. If a settlement is not reached, the Plaintiﬀ
has the possibility to either sue the Defendant or to drop the case. In
the event of litigation, each litigant incurs litigation costs. Hereinafter,
X represents the Plaintiﬀ’s litigation costs while Y represents the De-
fendant’s litigation costs. The values of X , Y , s and V are positive by
definition. The default litigation cost rule is the English Rule, where
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the loser in a lawsuit has to pay all the litigation costs, i.e. her costs
plus the winner’s costs (X+Y ). Persuant to the “divergent expectation”
hypothesis, each litigant has her own belief on the probability that the
Plaintiﬀ will prevail at trial. These beliefs are represented by qi 2 (0, 1)
where i 2 {P,D}. Therefore, the Defendant’s belief about the Plain-
tiﬀ’s probability of success is qD. On the other hand, the Defendant’s
belief about her probability of success is 1  qD. Note that the origin of
diﬀerences in litigants’ beliefs is not explained in the model, the model
assumes that parties somehow come to their beliefs. In Particular, liti-
gants may form diﬀerent beliefs about the case outcome due to diﬀerent
reasons. Firstly, litigants may have diﬀerent informations about the case;
the Defendant for instance may know more about her likelihood of being
found liable. Secondly, litigants may diﬀerently evaluate the legal argu-
ments that they are supposed to present in court. Finally, an important
role could be also played by litigants’ degree of optimism and by their
experience. All of these explanations are consistent with the presence of
informations asymmetries between the Plaintiﬀ and the Defendant. The
assumption is crucial for the development of the model. In fact, when lit-
igants have the same beliefs litigation never occurs (it would be irrational
to litigate)24.
24See Kirstein and Rickman (2004)
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The expected returns from litigation for the Plaintiﬀ (⇧P ) and for the
Defendant (⇧D) are then:
⇧P = qP (V ) + (1  qP )( Y  X) (5.1)
⇧D = (1  qD)(0) + (qD)( V  X   Y ) (5.2)
If the Plaintiﬀ wins (with expected probability qP ), she gets the case
value V . If instead the Plaintiﬀ loses (with expected probability 1  
qP ), following the English Rule, she pays both her and the Defendant’s
litigation costs (X + Y ). The same reasoning applies to the Defendant’s
expected return from litigation. Note that when the Defendant wins, her
payoﬀ is 0. In fact, in this case the Defendant simply avoids losing the
case value V and fully recovers litigation costs.
P,D
[s, s]
settlement
P
[⇧P ,⇧D]
litigation
[0, 0]
casedropped
no  settlemnt
Figure 5.1: The benchmark game
Figure 1 represents the sequence of the game. In the first stage of the
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game, parties bargain over a possible settlement (out of court), if they
reach an agreement (i.e. settle the case) the payoﬀs are s and  s for the
Plaintiﬀ and the Defendant respectively. If the litigants do not reach an
agreement, the game moves to the second stage where the Plaintiﬀ has
to decide on whether to sue the Defendant or to drop the case. If the
case is dropped, the payoﬀ is 0 for both litigants, otherwise, the case is
brought to the court and the payoﬀs are given by ⇧P and ⇧D.
The model is solved by backward induction. In the second stage the
Plaintiﬀ brings the case to the court only if her expected return from
litigation is higher than what she would otherwise get by dropping the
case, i.e. if ⇧P > 0. This condition can be written as:
qP >
X + Y
V +X + Y
(5.3)
When condition (5.3) is satisfied, the litigants go to court unless a settle-
ment has been reached in the first stage of the game. If the condition is
not satisfied the case is instead dropped. In the first stage, the Plaintiﬀ
settles the case only if the agreed settlement amount is higher than what
she would have expected from litigation, i.e. if s > ⇧P . By the same
reasoning, the Defendant settles only if s <  ⇧D. The settlement range
is then [⇧P, ⇧D]. Therefore a settlement is reached (the range is not
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empty) only when  ⇧D >⇧P , i.e. when:
qP < qD +
X + Y
V +X + Y
(5.4)
In other words, a mutually beneficial settlement exists when the Plain-
tiﬀ’s minimum acceptable settlement amount is smaller than the Defen-
dant’s maximum acceptable settlement amount. If this condition does
not hold, the case proceeds to court. For simplicity, it is assumed that
during the settlement stage the two litigants have the same bargaining
power, therefore, with the symmetric Nash bargaining solution, the set-
tlement outcome is (⇧P   ⇧D)/2:
s = 0, 5[(qP + qD)(V +X + Y ) X   Y ] (5.5)
Diﬀerences in litigants bargaining power would simply shift the range
point in which the settlement is reached; the more powerful the Plaintiﬀ
(Defendant), the closer the settlement is to ⇧P ( ⇧D). Of course, the
settlement is reached only when the Plaintiﬀ’s threat to sue in the second
stage is credible, i.e. only when equation (5.3) is satisfied25. To sum up,
in the benchmark case:
25Note that when a case is credible and when the settlement range is non-empty, it is assumed that parties settles
with equal bargaining power (so they settle in the middle of the range). This is why the settlement process is not
modeled as an oﬀer from the Defendant to the Plaintiﬀ.
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• Litigation occurs if qP > qD + X+YV+X+Y , i.e. if condition (5.4) is not
satisfied.
• The case is dropped if qP < X+YV+X+Y , i.e. if condition (5.3) is not
satisfied.
• The case is settled if X+YV+X+Y < qP < qD + X+YV+X+Y , i.e. if both
condition (5.3) and condition (5.4) are satisfied.
• The settlement amount is s = 0, 5[(qP + qD)(V +X + Y ) X   Y ]
(equation (5.5)).
Figure 5.2: The benchmark game outcomes
According to the results that have been reached, Figure 2 represents the
game outcome for each possible combination of the parameters qP and
qD26. The case is dropped in the lower rectangle where qP < X+YV+X+Y .
26These results are consistent with the results achieved in the existing law and economics literature. See for instance
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In the right area of the upper rectangle the litigants settle the case for
s and, finally, litigation occurs in the upper left triangle. The more the
Plaintiﬀ is optimistic with respect to the Defendant, and the greater
the case value V with respect to total costs X + Y , the more likely it
is that the Plaintiﬀ brings the case to justice (i.e. the smaller is the
"dropped cases” area). Note that when litigation occurs (in the upper
left triangle), the Plaintiﬀ’s belief on her probability of winning at trial is
always higher than the Defendant’s beliefs on the Plaintiﬀ’s probability
of winning a trial; i.e. qP > qD. This is true for any possible value of
litigants’ costs (X , Y ) and case value V ; intuitively, even if the case is
credible, the Plaintiﬀ always prefers to settle when she has a lower belief
on her probability of winning at trial than the Defendant.
5.3.2 Legal Aid
Following the model introduced for the benchmark case, this subsection
shows how introducing proportional legal aid aﬀects the number of cases
that are brought to justice, the decision to settle, and the settlement
amount. Other things being equal, the presence of legal aid aﬀects the
expected returns from litigation for the Plaintiﬀ, i.e. ⇧P and, conse-
quently, the amount which is bargained in the event of settlement, i.e. s.
Shavell (1982) and Kirstein and Rickman (2004).
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Therefore, under legal aid, the litigants’ expected returns from litigation
are given by:
⇧PA = qP (V ) + (1  qP )( Y   fX) (5.6)
⇧D = (1  qD)(0) + (qD)( V  X   Y ) (5.7)
Where f represents the fraction of the Plaintiﬀ’s own legal costs that is
not reimbursed by the state. If f = 0 legal aid covers all the litigation
costs incurred by the Plaintiﬀ (full coverage); if f = 1 the state does
not provide any legal aid to the Plaintiﬀ (hence the benchmark case is
restored). If finally, f is between 0 and 1, legal aid covers only a fraction
1  f of the legal costs incurred by the Plaintiﬀ (partial coverage). Note
that if the Plaintiﬀ looses the case, legal aid is not available for costs
payable by the Plaintiﬀ to the Defendant: f aﬀects X , not Y . The
specifcation of f is consistent with the proportional legal aid system
applied by most European countries. The game can be represented by
Figure 3.
As in the benchmark case, the game is solved by backward induction.
In the second stage, the Plaintiﬀ brings the case to court only if her
expected return from litigation is higher than what she otherwise would
get by dropping the case, i.e. if ⇧PA > 0. This condition can be written
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P,D
[s⇤, s⇤]
settlement
P
[⇧PA,⇧D]
litigation
[0, 0]
casedropped
no  settlemnt
Figure 5.3: The legal aid game
as:
qP >
fX + Y
V + fX + Y
(5.8)
When condition (5.8) is satisfied, the litigants go to court unless a settle-
ment has been reached in the first stage of the game; otherwise the case is
dropped. In the first stage, the Plaintiﬀ settles the case only if the agreed
settlement amount is higher than her expected return from litigation, i.e.
if s⇤ > ⇧PA. By the same reasoning, the Defendant settles if s⇤ <  ⇧D.
Therefore, the settlement range is [⇧PA, ⇧D]. A settlement is reached
only if the range is not empty, i.e. if  ⇧D >⇧PA, hence if:
qP < qD
V +X + Y
V + fX + Y
+
fX + Y
V + fX + Y
(5.9)
If no settlement is reached, the case proceeds to court. During the set-
tlement stage, the two litigants have the same bargaining power, and
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therefore the settlement outcome is:
s⇤ = 0, 5[(qD)(V +X + Y ) + qP (V + fX + Y )  fX   Y ] (5.10)
Of course, the settlement is reached only if the Plaintiﬀ’s threat to sue
in the second stage is credible, i.e. only if condition (5.8) is satisfied. To
sum up, the main results of the game are the following:
• Litigation occurs if qP > qD V+X+YV+fX+Y + fX+YV+fX+Y , i.e. if condition (5.9)
is not satisfied. Note that if litigation occurs qP is always higher than
qD.
• The case is dropped if qP < fX+YV+fX+Y , i.e. if condition (5.8) is not
satisfied.
• The case is settled if fX+YV+fX+Y < qP < qD V+X+YV+fX+Y + fX+YV+fX+Y , i.e. if
both condition (5.8) and condition (5.9) are satisfied.
• The settlement amount is s⇤ = 0, 5[(qD)(V +X+Y )+qP (V +fX+
Y )  fX   Y )] (equation (5.10)).
Figure 4 represents the game outcome for each possible combination of
the parameters qP and qD. The more the Plaintiﬀ is optimistic with
respect to the Defendant, and the greater the case value V with respect
to the amount of Plaintiﬀ’s costs that is not reimbursed by the state plus
5.3. THE MODEL 161
Figure 5.4: The legal aid game outcomes
the Defendant’s costs fX+Y , the more likely it is that the Plaintiﬀ brings
the case to justice (i.e. the lower is the “dropped cases” area). Note that
even if legal aid covers all the Plaintiﬀ’s own litigation costs (i.e. when
f = 0), the Plaintiﬀ is not willing to bring to court certain cases because
of the cost she would have to reimburse to the Defendant in the event of
defeat: even under full coverage, the Plaintiﬀ is not guaranteed to be free
of financial risk. Again, if litigation occurs (in the upper left triangle),
the Plaintiﬀ belief on her probability of winning at trial is always higher
than the Defendant’s beliefs on the Plaintiﬀ’s probability of winning a
trial; i.e. qP > qD.
By comparing Figure 2 and Figure 4, it is possible to analyse the eﬀects
on the Plaintiﬀ’s credibility to sue and on the litigation versus settlement
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process, if legal aid is introduced into the analysis; i.e. when moving from
the benchmark case (English rule) to the case with legal aid.
1. In Figure 4, the area of the lower rectangle (where the threat to sue is
not credible and the cases are dropped) is always smaller with respect
to the same area in the Figure 2 ( X+YV+X+Y >
fX+Y
V+fX+Y ). Under legal
aid, the Plaintiﬀ’s threat to sue becomes more credible, i.e. legal
aid makes cases credible, that were otherwise weak. In fact, legal
aid lowers the Plaintiﬀ’s expected costs from litigation, increasing
her expected return from litigation (⇧PA > ⇧P ), and consequently
her willingness to bring a case to justice. Thus, the number of cases
that are dropped decreases with the introduction of legal aid. This
result is exacerbated the greater is the percentage of the Plaintiﬀ’s
costs supported by the state (i.e. the lower is f); in fact, the more
the state supports the Plaintiﬀs, the higher is the increase in the
Plaintiﬀ’s expected return from litigation.
2. The area of the upper left triangle in Figure 4, where credible cases
are litigated, is larger with respect to the same area in the Figure 2.
This is true given the analysis that has been conducted in the pre-
vious point. Under legal aid, the number of cases that are litigated
then increases. In fact, some of the cases that were settled or dropped
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in the benchmark case are instead litigated under legal aid. In fact,
for a subset of cases that were either settled or dropped in the bench-
mark case, the Plaintiﬀ is more inclined to litigate instead of reaching
a settlement, as the burden of legal costs has been reduced (⇧PA is
bigger than ⇧P ). On the other hand, the Defendant’s incentive to
settle is the same as in the benchmark case (⇧D doesn’t change).
Therefore the condition for litigation to occurs (⇧P >  ⇧D) is
more likely satisfied. As before, this result is exacerbated the greater
the percentage of the Plaintiﬀ’s costs supported by the state is.
3. The area of the graph where cases are settled is larger under legal
aid (Figure (4)). In fact, a subset of cases that were not brought to
justice without legal aid is now settled. This subset is bigger than
the subset of settled cases that are instead litigated under legal aid.
This can be shown by looking at the conditions for settlement under
the two instruments. In the benchmark case the case is settled in
the interval X+YV+X+Y < qP < qD+
X+Y
V+X+Y ; under legal aid instead the
case is settled in the interval fX+YV+fX+Y < qP < qD
V+X+Y
V+fX+Y +
fX+Y
V+fX+Y .
Mathematically, when legal aid is provided: 1) the right part of the
interval always decreases, increasing the settlement range ( X+YV+X+Y >
fX+Y
V+fX+Y ). 2) the left part can instead either decrease (decreasing
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the settlement range) or increases (increasing the settlement range)
(qD V+X+YV+fX+Y +
fX+Y
V+fX+Y > [<]qD +
X+Y
V+X+Y only if qD > [<]
fX+Y
V+fX+Y ).
However, even if the left part of the interval decreases, it decreases
less than the right part of the interval (in fact X+YV+X+Y   fX+YV+fX+Y >
qD +
X+Y
V+X+Y   qD V+X+YV+fX+Y   fX+YV+fX+Y is always verified). Therefore,
overall the settlement rate increases. Moreover, since the Plaintiﬀ
is less willing to accept a settlement oﬀer, the bargained settlement
amount under legal aid increases from s to s⇤ (with s⇤ > s) 27. Again,
this result is exacerbated the greater the percentage of the Plaintiﬀ’s
costs supported by the state is.
This analysis leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: Legal aid 1) Adds credibility to the Plaintiﬀ’s threat to
sue, i.e. the number of cases that are dropped by the Plaintiﬀ decreases.
2) Increases the number of cases that proceed to trial, i.e. the litigation
rate increases. 3) Increases the number of cases that are settled out of
court. 4) Increases the settlement amount.
5.3.3 The Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule
According to the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule, fees are shifted
only in favour of the Plaintiﬀ; while a successful Plaintiﬀ would recover
27This is the case continuing to assume that the party has the same bargaining power.
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litigation costs, a successful Defendant would not. The Defendant always
has to pay her costs independently of the outcome of the case. Below it is
analysed how the model changes with the introduction of the Favouring
Plaintiﬀ Rule. Other things being equal, the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule
aﬀects the expected returns from litigation for the Plaintiﬀ and for the
Defendant, i.e. ⇧P and ⇧D and, consequently the settlement amount
s. Under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ fee-shifting Rule, the litigants’ expected
returns from litigation are then given by:
⇧P P = qP (V ) + (1  qP )( X) (5.11)
⇧DP = (1  qD)( Y ) + (qD)( V  X   Y ) (5.12)
In the event of victory, the Plaintiﬀ (with expected probability qP ) gets
the value of the case V and recovers litigation costs. When instead the
Plaintiﬀ loses (with expected probability 1 qP ), she has only to pay her
costs X . In fact, the Defendant always has to pay her costs Y indepen-
dently of whether she wins (with expected probability 1 qD) or whether
she loses (with expected probability qD); in the latter case the Defendant
also loses the case value V and has to reimburse the Plaintiﬀ’s costs X .
The game can be represented by Figure 5. In the second stage, the Plain-
tiﬀ brings the case to the court only if her expected return from litigation
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P,D
[s0, s0]
settlement
P
[⇧PP ,⇧DP ]
litigation
[0, 0]
casedropped
no  settlement
Figure 5.5: The favouring Plaintiﬀ game
is higher than what she otherwise would get by dropping the case, i.e. if
⇧P P > 0. This condition can be written as:
qP >
X
V +X
(5.13)
When condition (5.13) is satisfied, the litigants go to court unless a set-
tlement has been reached in the first stage of the game; otherwise the
case is dropped. In the first stage, the Plaintiﬀ settles the case only if
the agreed settlement amount is higher than her expected return from
litigation, i.e. if s0 > ⇧P P . By the same reasoning, the Defendant set-
tles if s0 <  ⇧DP . Therefore the settlement range is [⇧P P , ⇧DP ].
A settlement is reached only when the range is not empty, i.e. when
 ⇧DP >⇧P P , hence when:
qP < qD +
X + Y
V +X
(5.14)
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If no settlement is reached, the case proceeds to court. During the settle-
ment stage, the two litigants have the same bargaining power, therefore
the settlement outcome is:
s0 = 0, 5[(qP + qD)(V +X) X + Y ] (5.15)
Of course, the settlement is reached only when the Plaintiﬀ’s treat to sue
in the second stage is credible, i.e. only if condition (5.13) is satisfied.
To sum up, the main results of the game are the following:
• Litigation occurs if qP > qD + X+YV+X , i.e. if condition (5.14) is not
satisfied. Note that if litigation occurs qP is always higher than qD.
• The case is dropped if qP < XV+X , i.e. if condition (5.13) is not
satisfied.
• The case is settled if XV+X < qP < qD + X+YV+X , i.e. if both condition
(5.13) and condition (5.14) are satisfied.
• The settlement amount is s0 = 0, 5[(qP+qD)(V+X) X+Y ](equation
(5.15)).
Figure 6 represents the game outcome for each possible combination of
the parameters qP and qD.
By comparing Figure 2 and Figure 6, it is possible to analyze the
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Figure 5.6: The favouring Plaintiﬀ game outcomes
eﬀects on the Plaintiﬀ’s credibility and on the litigation versus settlement
process when moving from the benchmark case (English rule) to the
Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule.
1. In Figure 6 the area of the lower rectangle (where the threat to sue
is not credible) is smaller with respect to the same area in Figure 2
( X+YV+X+Y >
X
V+X ). Under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule, the Plaintiﬀ’s
threat to sue becomes then more credible. In fact, the Favouring
Plaintiﬀ Rule lowers the Plaintiﬀ’s expected costs from litigation,
increasing her expected return from litigation (⇧P P > ⇧P ). This in-
creases the likelihood of a case becoming credible and, consequently,
the number of cases that are dropped decreases. This result is ex-
acerbated the higher are the Defendant’s litigation costs (the higher
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Y , the higher ⇧P P   ⇧P ).
2. The area of the upper left triangle in Figure 6 (where credible cases
are litigated) is smaller with respect to the same area in Figure 2
( X+YV+X+Y >
fX+Y
V+fX+Y and
V Y
V+X <
V
V+X+Y ). Therefore, under the
Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule, the number of cases that proceed to court
decreases. In fact, some of the cases that were litigated under the
English Rule are instead settled for s0 under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ
Rule. This is because although the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule increases
the Plaintiﬀ’s expected return from litigation (⇧P P > ⇧P ) and
decreases the Defendant’s one (⇧DP < ⇧D), the negative eﬀect
on the Defendant’s expected return from litigation is greater than
the positive eﬀect on the Plaintiﬀ’s expected return from litigation.
Mathematically, ⇧P P  ⇧P < ⇧D  ⇧DP only when (1  qD)Y >
(1   qP )Y , i.e. when qP > qD; when litigation occurs this is always
true. Following the model, this results in an overall decrease in the
number of the credible cases that proceed to court (the condition for
litigation to occurs (⇧P >  ⇧D) is less likely to be satisfied), and
consequently in an increase in the number of the credible cases that
are settled. Moreover, a decrease in the litigation rate also means
that all the credible cases that were dropped in the benchmark case
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do not proceed to court but are instead settled for s0.
3. The area of the graph where cases are settled is larger when the
Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule is applied (Figure 6). In fact, both the non-
dropped and the non-litigated cases that were dropped or litigated
in the benchmark case are now settled for s0. Moreover, Under the
Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule, the bargained settlement amount (contin-
uing to assume that the parties have the same bargaining power)
increases from s to s0 (s0 > s); in fact given her higher expected re-
turn from litigation the Plaintiﬀ is less willing to accept a settlement
oﬀer; on the other hand the Defendant, given the lower expected
return from litigation is more willing to oﬀer higher settlement.
This analysis leads to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: By applying the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule 1) The Plain-
tiﬀ’s credibility to sue increases, i.e. the number of cases that are dropped
decreases. 2) The number of cases that proceed to trial decreases, i.e. the
litigation rate decreases 3) Both the non-dropped and the non-litigated
cases that were before dropped and litigated are settled. 4) The settle-
ment amount increases.
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5.3.4 Legal aid versus The Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule
In the previous subsections, it has been demonstrated how legal aid and
the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule can aﬀect the Plaintiﬀ’s credibility to sue
and the litigants’ choice between settlement and litigation in Europe. In
this subsection legal aid and the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule are compared
to show how the two instruments diﬀerently aﬀect the Plaintiﬀ credibility
to sue, the litigation rate, and the settlement rate and amount.
The Plaintiﬀ ’s credibility to sue
Both legal aid and the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule increase the Plaintiﬀ’s
credibility to sue, hence they both achieve the goal of decreasing the
number of cases that are not brought to justice. In fact, both instruments
reduce the Plaintiﬀ’s expected costs from litigation. In particular, while
under legal aid the state bears at least a fraction of the personal costs
that the Plaintiﬀ would otherwise have to support, under the Favouring
Plaintiﬀ Rule the Defendant, by bearing her legal costs also in the event of
victory (instead of the Plaintiﬀ), reduces the burden of legal costs for the
Plaintiﬀ. Therefore, while legal aid reduces or eliminates the Plaintiﬀ’s
financial risk of having to pay her own legal costs, the Favouring Plaintiﬀ
Rule eliminates the Plaintiﬀ’s risk of having to reimburse her opponent’s
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legal costs. The magnitude of the decrease in the number of dropped
case is diﬀerent between the two instruments. Intuitively, the instrument
that reduces more the Plaintiﬀ’s expected costs from litigation is the
instrument that is more eﬀective in decreasing the number of cases that
are dropped. This can be investigated by the usual graphical analysis.
Firstly, as demonstrated in previous sections, both in Figure 4 (legal aid)
and in Figure 6 (the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule) the area where cases are
dropped is always smaller than the same area in Figure 2 (the benchmark
case). Secondly, the area where cases are dropped in Figure 4 (legal aid) is
bigger than the same area in Figure 6 (Favouring Plaintiﬀ rule) only when
fX+Y
V+fX+Y >
X
V+X (i.e. when Y > X(1  f)). On the other hand, the area
where cases are dropped in Figure 4 (legal aid) is smaller than the same
area in Figure 6 (Favouring Plaintiﬀ rule) only when fX+YV+fX+Y <
X
V+X
(i.e. when Y < X(1   f)). Therefore, the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule is
more eﬀective in increasing the Plaintiﬀ’s credibility to sue than legal aid
only when
X(1  f) < Y (5.16)
i.e. when the amount of the Plaintiﬀ’s legal cost that is reimbursed
through legal aid (X(1   f)) is higher than the Defendant’s legal costs
(Y ). The likelihood that the condition is satisfied depends then on three
5.3. THE MODEL 173
factors: (i) the amount that the state does not reimburse to the Plain-
tiﬀ under legal aid (positive relationship), (ii) the Plaintiﬀ’s legal costs
(negative relationship), and (iii) the Defendant’s legal costs (positive re-
lationship). This result is intuitive: the higher is (i), the lower is (ii)
and the higher is (iii), the more likely it is that the reduction in the
Plaintiﬀ’s expected costs is higher under the Favouring Defendant Rule
when moving from the benchmark case (as compared with the case of
legal aid). Note that when the Defendant’s legal costs are higher than
the Plaintiﬀ’s legal costs (i.e. when Y > X), condition (5.16) is always
satisfied; hence, in this case, the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule is always more
eﬀective in increasing the Plaintiﬀ’s access to justice than legal aid.
The Litigation Rate
Under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule, the number of cases that are brought
to court (i.e. the litigation rate) is always lower than under legal aid. In
fact, while under legal aid some of the cases that were dropped in the
benchmark case are litigated, under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule all the
cases that become credible, and also some of the cases that were litigated
in the benchmark case, are always settled. This is because under legal
aid the decrease in the expected litigation costs for the Plaintiﬀ is not
compensated by a higher increase in the Defendant’s litigation costs.
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Graphically, the area of the upper left triangle (where litigation occurs)
in Figure 4 (legal aid) is always bigger than the same area in Figure
6 (Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule). Of course, the gap between the litigation
rates under the two instruments increases: (i) the higher is the negative
diﬀerence between the negative eﬀect on the Defendant’s expected return
from litigation and the positive eﬀect on the Plaintiﬀ’s expected return
from litigation under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule (i.e. the higher is Y ),
and (ii) the lower is the fraction of costs that is not reimbursed under
legal aid (i.e. lower is f and the higher is X).
Settlement
Both legal aid and the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule increase the number of
cases that are settled out of court and the settlement amount. Graphi-
cally, both in Figure 4 (legal aid) and in Figure 6 (the Favouring Plaintiﬀ
Rule), the area where cases are settled is always bigger than the same
area in Figure 2 (the benchmark case). However, the magnitude of the
increase is diﬀerent between the two instruments. Again, the diﬀerence
depends on the quantum of costs that the state reimburses to the Plaintiﬀ
under legal aid and on the size of the litigants’ costs. Of course, this result
is strictly related to the previous ones. In particular, when the increase
in the number of cases that are brought to justice is higher under the
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Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule than under legal aid (i.e. when X(1  f) < Y ),
the number of settled cases and the settlement amount are always higher
under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule than under legal aid. Graphically,
when fX+YV+fX+Y   XV+X (i.e. when condition (5.16) is satisfied), the area
where cases are settled in Figure 4 (legal aid) is always smaller than
the same area in Figure 6 (the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule). Moreover, in
this case, the settlement amount is always greater under the Favoruing
Plaintiﬀ Rule (s0 > s⇤). On the other hand, when condition (5.16) is
not satisfied the diﬀerence in the magnitude of the increase in the set-
tlement rate and amount between the two instruments depends on the
usual parameters.
This analysis leads to Proposition 3.
Proposition 3:
1) By reducing the Plaintiﬀ’s expected costs from litigation, both legal
aid and the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule achieve the goal of increasing the
Plaintiﬀ’s credibility to sue and hence reduce the number of cases that
are not brought to justice. In this respect, the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule
is more eﬀective than legal aid only when it provides the Plaintiﬀ with
a higher benefit, i.e when it causes a higher reduction in her expected
costs. This is always true when the Defendant’s legal costs are higher
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than the Plaintiﬀ’s legal costs. 2) While under legal aid the litigation
rate increases, under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule the number of cases
that are litigated decreases. 3) The number of cases that are settled
out of court and the settlement amount increase both under legal aid
and under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule. The diﬀerence in the increase
between the two instruments depends on the outcomes of the changes in
points 1) and 2). When the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule is more eﬀective than
legal aid in increasing the Plaintiﬀ’s credibility to sue it also increases
more the number of cases that are settled and the settlement amount.
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5.4 Discussion and Conclusion
This Chapter began with the research question on whether the Favour-
ing Plaintiﬀ Rule can be an alternative to legal aid for assisting wealth
constrained Plaintiﬀs in bringing to justice cases that would have oth-
erwise been dropped. Further to the results of the model used in this
Chapter, it was demonstrated that this is indeed the case and, under
certain conditions the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule may even be more eﬀec-
tive. In fact, both legal aid and the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule, reduce
the Plaintiﬀ’s expected costs from litigation; hence, the Plaintiﬀ needs
less of its own resources to bring a case to justice. Under legal aid, the
cost of reducing the Plaintiﬀ’s expected litigation expenditure is sup-
ported by the state, which bears at least a fraction of the Plaintiﬀ’s legal
costs. Instead, under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule, the cost is supported
by the Defendant, which supports a fraction of the Plaintiﬀ’s expected
expenditures. Therefore, while legal aid increases public expenditure,
the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule simply shifts wealth from the Defendant to
the Plaintiﬀ. The issue that then arises is how the Favouring Plaintiﬀ
Rule can be implemented from a policy perspective. To implement such
a rule policymakers would have to set the conditions under which the
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rule would apply; such conditions would likely be similar to the income
thresholds that each country stipulated for the access to legal aid. For
instance thresholds could be set in a way that when the Plaintiﬀ has
an income below the existing threshold for legal aid access, the Favour-
ing Plaintiﬀ Rule would be applied if the Defendant has an income in
a high pre-defined income category (for example an income higher than
200.000 euros per year). Thresholds could vary from country to country
depending on income distribution and inequality level. The rule would
apply only when the financial resources of the litigants are suﬃciently
disparate and would provide a one-way transfer of wealth from wealthy
people to wealth-constrained people (never vice-versa). The eﬀects of
wealth inequality on the litigation and settlement process would then be
reduced. Section 3 showed that when the Defendant has higher litigation
costs than the Plaintiﬀ (Y > X), the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule is always
more eﬀective than legal aid in increasing the Plaintiﬀ credibility to sue
and the settlement amount. Although in this Chapter litigants’ legal
costs are exogenous, it is reasonable to expect that this is indeed the case
in litigations among wealthy Defendants (i.e. with an income in a high
income class) and Plaintiﬀs with low financial resources (i.e. that satisfy
the requirements to have access to legal aid); in fact the Defendant is
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not constraint and is more able to support the costs for expensive tests
to prove her rights. To sum up the Favouring Plaintiﬀ rule would allow
European policymakers to save at least a part of the budget reserved for
legal aid, and would reach the same goals of legal aid in a more eﬀec-
tive way.. It is acknowledged that such provisions may lead to concerns
about the aforementioned redistribute eﬀects of such a policy; however,
a debate on the appropriateness of using legal rules as an instrument of
redistribution is outside of the scope of this Chapter, and nevertheless
do not aﬀect the results of the analysis.
Another possible issue is that, like legal aid, the Favouring Plaintiﬀ
Rule may have the shortcoming of adding credibility to some “low merit”
cases (i.e frivolous cases) that would otherwise be dropped and that,
if litigated, would only represent a waste of public resources and time.
Therefore, both instruments may generate some ineﬃciencies. As such,
it would appear that there is a trade-oﬀ between access to justice and
legal system eﬃciency. Although an analysis of this trade-oﬀ is out of the
scope of this Chapter, it has to be noted that while low merit cases that
become credible could be litigated under legal aid - hence increasing the
litigation rate, under the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule, these cases are always
settled and therefore the litigation rate is unaﬀected. This seems to be
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an argument in favour of the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule, relative to Legal
Aid, regarding eﬃciency concerns.
This Chapter provides European policymakers with an alternative in-
strument to legal aid for avoiding that potential Plaintiﬀs do not bring
to justice meritorious cases because of cost barriers. Another interesting
extension is to consider also the case of Defendants that are not willing to
enter the litigation process because of their low wealth and consequently
accept unfavourable settlements. In fact, to solve this issue an alternative
to legal aid could be represented by the Favouring Defendant Rule.
Future works could analyse the aforementioned concerns and exten-
sion, and could also consider some possible complications in the model28.
28For example, litigants may diﬀer in they risk preferences and hence the assumption of risk neutrality could be
released.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Results
While the Law and Economic literature regarding fee-shifting rules in
litigation and their eﬀects on litigants behaviour and decisions is wide and
growing fast it has mainly focused on the analysis of the English Rule and
of the American Rule and has failed in recognising the relevance of other
rules. The general aim of this thesis is to use and to refine traditional
models of civil litigation in an attempt to describe the features and the
eﬀects on the litigation process of another type of fee-shifting rule, the
One-way fee-shifting Rule. This rule has a peculiar feature: fees are
entirely shifted in favour of one party, regardless of the litigation outcome.
While the approach adopted here is based on theoretical model and uses
tools derived from Game Theory, the thesis has shown how the results
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can be exploited to provide valuable policy implications.
Chapter 2 provided a descriptive analysis on litigation costs and laid out
the foundations for a complete understanding of the essays presented in
the remaining chapters of the thesis. The chapter provided descriptions
and definitions of litigation costs, rules governing the allocation of legal
expenses among litigants and mechanisms/instruments for financing civil
litigation. The chapter also illustrated how diﬀerent jurisdictions around
the world fit into the analysis, finally presenting a case study about Italy.
Chapter 3 presented a contribution to the existing literature by apply-
ing and refining a general rent-seeking model to describe the feature
of the One-Way fee-shifting Rule. The theoretical model has demon-
strated how, unlike the English and the American Rules, the One-way
fee-shifting Rule can reduce the eﬀects on litigation outcome of ability
gaps between litigants (ability gap refers to all the situations in which
one of the two litigants has a higher return from spending in litigation
than the other). The One-Way fee-shifting Rule, indeed, provides incen-
tives to the favoured litigant to exert more eﬀort than the disadvantaged
one and this increases the favoured litigant’s probability of winning at
6.1. RESULTS 183
trial. The aforementioned features make the One-way fee-shifting Rule a
valuable policy instrument in reducing undesirable ability gaps between
litigants. The chapter provided also some examples and possible areas
of application of such rule. Regarding eﬃciency, the chapter has also
considered the implications of moving from an English system to a One-
way fee-shifting one on total litigation cost and litigation rate (two of the
main indicators of a civil legal system eﬃciency). Despite the ambiguity
of this eﬀect, a trade oﬀ between litigation rate and litigation costs has
been found; the litigation rate decreases if total litigation costs increase
and vice-versa.
Chapter 4 provided a numerical valuations of the results of the general
model presented in Chapter 3. The aim was to capture the eﬀect of
moving from an English system to a One-way fee-shifting one on total
litigation cost and litigation rate which turned out to be ambiguous in
the Chapter 3 general model. The main result was that when the afore-
mentioned shift happens, total litigation costs always decrease while lit-
igation rate increases. If the benefit in terms of lower legal expenditure
is higher than the cost in term of a higher litigation rate, the adoption of
the One-Way fee-shifting Rule implies an improvement in the legal sys-
tem eﬃciency. The magnitude of the trade oﬀ between litigation costs
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and litigation rate is not captured by the model and depends on several
exogenous variables such as the type of dispute and the intrinsic char-
acteristics of litigants; factors that the policy maker has to assess before
deciding if to apply the One-way fee-shifting Rule or not.
Chapter 5 illustrated a diﬀerent theoretical approach to the issues, by
considering a general settlement model where legal expenditures are taken
as given. Therefore, the model focused on the pre-trial bargaining stage
and made legal expenditures exogenous (while in the previous chapters
the settlement stage was not considered and legal expenditures were en-
dogenous). The general aim was twofold: show how a Favouring Plaintiﬀ
Rule could be used as an instrument for assisting wealth constrained
Plaintiﬀs in pursuing cases that would otherwise be dropped; and to
show how, in this respect, the rule could be a valid alternative to legal
aid. Firstly it has been showed that the One-way fee-shifting Rule (in its
favouring Plaintiﬀ verison), compared to the English Rule increases the
number of cases that the Plaintiﬀ would bring to justice by increasing the
Plaintiﬀ’s credibility to sue and her willingness to go to court. However,
the aforementioned increase does not translate into higher litigation rate,
as suggested by Chapter 4, but it translates, instead, into a higher num-
ber of settled cases. As a matter of fact, both the non-dropped and the
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non-litigated cases that were dropped under the English Rule are instead
settled under the One-Way fee-shifting Rule. The Chapter also demon-
strated how the features of the One-way fee-shifting Rule make it a valid,
and under certain conditions better, alternative to legal aid in facilitating
the Plaintiﬀ’s access to Justice. Therefore, from a policy perspective, the
chapter provided European policymakers with an alternative instrument
to legal aid for avoiding that potential Plaintiﬀs do not bring to justice
meritorious cases because of cost barriers; and also discussed how the
rule could then be implemented.
In sum, all the chapters of the thesis combine with each other to reach
the goals of providing an economic analysis of the One-Way fee-shifting
Rule and of its eﬀects on the litigation process and of discussing policy
implications also looking at concrete and real cases. The One-Way fee-
shifting Rule incentivises the favoured litigant to exert more eﬀort than
the disadvantaged one and this increases the favoured litigant’s prob-
ability of winning at trial. When moving from an English system to
a One-way fee-shifting one, total litigation costs always decreases while
the number of cases that are brought to justice increase. If a settlement
stage is out of the picture (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) a higher number
of cases that are brought to justice translates into higher litigation rate;
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otherwise (Chapter 5) it translates into higher number of cases that are
settled. More precisely, the One-way fee-shifting Rule (Favouring Plain-
tiﬀ) increases the Plaintiﬀ’s credibility to sue and this translates into
higher settlement rate and settlement amount. A similar result can be
achieved with the implementation of legal aid; however legal aid always
increases litigation rate and public expenditure.
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6.2 Insights for Future Research
First, this thesis aims at stimulating the academic and political debate
on the analysis and the use of the One-way fee-shifting Rule which has
been lacking so far. Future research might try to test the theoretical
predictions of the models here provided, for example by means of lab-
oratory experiments. Lawyers and political science scholars can exploit
the results to identify classes of litigation, types of litigants or area of
the law where the features of the One-way fee-shifting Rule can promote
eﬃciency and/or fairness.
Furthemore, while this thesis mainly focused on how the One-way fee-
shifting Rule impacts on legal expenditures and the litigation rate by
aﬀecting parties’ incentives to litigate and their behaviours during the
litigation stage, future research can focus on the eﬀects of such rule on
the incentives to comply with the law (i.e. on people primary conduct)1
and on the type and merit of cases that are litigated (i.e. on the evolution
and form of the law itself).
1Regarding compliance with the law, Hylton (1993) used numerical simulations showing how the Favouring Plaintiﬀ
One-way fee-shifitng Rule leads to the highest level of compliance and least amount of litigation. This conclusions,
however, depend on the functional form used in his simulations, and assume that litigation costs are fixed and do not
depend on litigants’ choices.
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Eﬀects on the incentives to comply with the law: The core of the
thesis showed how the One-way fee-shifitng Rule, compared to the En-
glish Rule, increases (respectively, decreases) the favoured litigant (dis-
advantaged litigant) probability of winning a trial and her willingness
to litigate. When the Favouring Plaintiﬀ Rule is adopted it makes a
wrongdoer (the potential Defendant) possibility for being sued in court
more likely and also increases her expected litigation costs. This can be
seen as a disincentive for potential wrongdoers, acting as an increase in
punishment for the violation of norms2 and thus should helps promoting
substantive compliance.
Eﬀects on the evolution of the Law: Litigation and cases selection
has the benefit of creating precedents and defining legal principles (Luppi
and Parisi (2012)). From a social point of view, to promote transparency
and certainty of the law, the "best cases" are those with balanced mer-
its. As a matter of fact, frivolous cases should not be filed, and strong
cases should be settled without litigation (Carbonara et al. (2015)). The
One-way fee-shifting Rule could then be used to promote these "socially
valuable litigation". For instance, the One-way fee-shifting Rule can re-
duce the eﬀect of ability gaps between litigants that do not depend on
2In this regard see Rose-Ackerman and Geistfeld (1987).
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the merit of the case. Those ability gaps can results in the filing of non
meritorious cases that would not contribute to the evolution of the law.
To sum up, the general idea is that the One-way fee-shifting Rule
should also be considered as an instrument for promoting legal com-
pliance and socially valuable litigation. Future research could further
develop the theoretical models illustrated in the present work in order to
provide a more thorough and empirically grounded quantitative analysis.
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 Summary 
While the Law and Economic literature regarding fee-shifting rules in litigation and their effects 
on litigants’ behaviour and decisions is wide and growing fast it has mainly focused on the 
analysis of the English Rule and of the American Rule and has failed in recognising the 
relevance of other rules. The general aim of this thesis is to use and to refine traditional models 
of civil litigation in an attempt to describe the features and the effects on the litigation process of 
another type of fee-shifting rule, the One-way fee-shifting Rule. Under the One-way fee-shifting 
Rule, one party recovers her litigation costs in the event of litigation (the advantaged party) 
whereas the other party (the disadvantaged one) is not allowed to do so. If the Plaintiff is the 
advantaged party the rule is known as the Favouring Plaintiff Rule; if the Defendant is the 
advantaged party the rule is instead known as the Favouring Defendant Rule. While the approach 
adopted here is based on theoretical model and uses tools derived from Game Theory, the thesis 
has shown how the results can be exploited to show valuable policy implications. It has been 
shown how the One-way fee-shifting Rule incentivises the favoured litigant to exert more effort 
than the disadvantaged one and this increases the favoured litigant’s probability of winning at 
trial. When moving from an English system to a One-way fee-shifting one, total litigation costs 
always decreases while the number of cases that are brought to justice increase. If a settlement 
stage is out of the picture a higher number of cases that are brought to justice translates into 
higher litigation rate; otherwise it translates into higher number of cases that are settled. More 
precisely, the One-way fee-shifting Rule (Favouring Plaintiff) increases the Plaintiff’s credibility 
to sue and this translates into higher settlement rate and settlement amount. A similar result can 
be achieved with the implementation of legal aid; however legal aid always increases litigation 
rate and public expenditure. 
 
	
 
Samenvatting: 
Hoewel er een grote en groeiende hoeveelheid rechtseconomische literatuur beschikbaar is over 
regels betreffende proceskosten en de effecten daarvan op het gedrag en de beslissingen van de 
procespartijen, heeft deze literatuur zich vooral toegespitst op de analyse van de Engelse regel en 
de Amerikaanse regel en verzuimd het belang van andere regels te onderkennen. De algemene 
doelstelling van deze dissertatie is om traditionele modellen van civiele procesvoering toe te 
passen en te verfijnen in een poging de kenmerken en effecten van een ander type regel voor 
kostenafwenteling op het rechtsproces te beschrijven: One-way fee-shifting. Onder deze regel 
kan een van de partijen (de bevoordeelde partij) haar proceskosten in een rechtszaak op de 
andere partij afwentelen, terwijl dit voor die andere partij (de benadeelde partij) niet is 
toegestaan. Als de eiser de bevoordeelde partij is, staat de regel bekend als de ‘eiser 
bevoordelende regel’; als de gedaagde de bevoordeelde partij is, staat de regel bekend als de 
‘gedaagde bevoordelende regel’. Hoewel de gekozen benadering is gebaseerd op theoretische 
modellen en gebruik maakt van instrumenten die zijn afgeleid van de speltheorie, laat de 
dissertatie zien hoe de resultaten kunnen worden benut om waardevolle beleidsimplicaties te 
laten zien. Er wordt aangetoond hoe One-way fee-shifting de begunstigde procespartij stimuleert 
om meer te investeren in het proces dan de benadeelde procespartij, en dit vergroot de kans van 
de begunstigde procespartij om het proces te winnen. Bij een overgang van het Engelse systeem 
naar een systeem van One-way fee-shifting nemen de totale proceskosten altijd af, terwijl het 
aantal zaken stijgt. Als een schikking niet mogelijk is, resulteert een hoger aantal zaken in meer 
gerechtelijke procedures; in het andere geval resulteert het in meer schikkingen. Nauwkeuriger 
gezegd verhoogt One-way fee-shifting (eiser bevoordelend) de geloofwaardigheid van de eiser 
dat hij een proces zal aanspannen en dit resulteert in een hoger schikkingspercentage en hogere 
bedragen waarvoor geschikt wordt. Een vergelijkbaar resultaat kan worden bereikt met 
rechtsbijstand; rechtsbijstand verhoogt echter altijd het percentage gerechtelijke procedures en de 
publieke uitgaven. 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
 
  
Curriculum vitae 
 
Filppo Roda 
filippo.roda@edle-phd.eu 
 
 
Short bio  
 
My main research interests are applied microeconomic theory and financial 
economics.  
 
I am a teaching assistant at University of Bologna and Johns Hopkins-School 
od Advanced International Studies.  
 
I am also a market analyst for a private Italian Company. I develop 
econometrics model for agro-food commodities price forecasts. 
Education 
B.A. in Financial Economics; University of Bologna 2007 -2010 
M.Sc. in Economics (110 summa cum Laude); University of Bologna 2010 -2013 
Ph.d in Law and Economics; Bologna, Hamburg, Rotterdam 2013 -now 
Work experience 
Teaching assistantship; University of Bologna 2015 -2017 
Teaching assistantship; Johns Hopkins  2016 
Commodity Market Analyst; Areté Bologna 2016 -now 
Prizes and awards 
Ph.D. Scholarship; University of Bologna 2013 -2016 
Working Papers 
The Favouring Plaintiff Fee-Shifting Rule in Europe: An alternative to 
Legal Aid in Financing Civil Litigation.   
2016 
The Economic Analysis of the One-Way Fee-Shifting Rule In 
Litigation. 
2014 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
 
  
EDLE PhD Portfolio 
 
 
Name PhD student : Filippo Roda   
PhD-period  : 2013-2018   
Promoters  : Emanuela Carbonara and Louis Visscher  
   
 
PhD training 
 
Bologna courses         year 
BEHAVIORAL	L&E	(CARBONARA)	30/30 2013 
EXPERIMENTAL	L&E	(CASARI)	28/30 2013 
ENFORCEMENT	MECHANISM	(VANIN)	30L/30 2013 
STATISTICS	(GIOVAGNOLI)	26/30 2013 
GAME	THEORY	AND	LAW	(FRANZONI)	30/30 2014 
EC.		OF	EUROPEAN	COMPETITION	LAW	(DENICOLÒ)	30/30 2014 
ITALIAN	LEGAL	SYSTEM	(DE	PRÀ)	30L/30 2014 
EUROPEAN	SECURITIES	AND	COMPANY	(POMELLI) 2014 
THE	ECONOMIC	ANALYSIS	OF	LAW	(PARISI)	30L/30 2014 
MODELLING	PRIVATE	LAW	 2015 
Specific courses         year 
GERMAN	LAW	(HAMBURG) 2014 
THE	ECONOMICS	OF	LAW	ENFORCEMENT	(HAMBURG) 2014 
RISK	SAVVY	(HAMBURG)	 2014 
ECONOMETRICS:	INTRODUCTION	(HAMBURG) 2014 
ECONOMETRICS	SEMINAR	(ROTTERDAM)	 2014 
ACADEMIC	WRITING	SKILLS	FOR	PH.D	STUDENTS	(ROTTERDAM)	 2014 
Seminars and workshops       year 
UNIVERSITY	OF	BOLOGNA	(SEMINAR	SERIES;	DEP.	OF	ECONOMICS)	 2013-2017 
BOLOGNA	NOVEMBER	SEMINAR		 2013 
BACT	SEMINAR	SERIES		 2014 
EGSL	LUNCH	SEMINARS		 2014 
ROTTERDAM	FALL	SEMINAR	SERIES		 2014 
ROTTERDAM	WINTER	SEMINAR	SERIES		 2014 
ECONOMETRICS	SEMINAR	(ROTTERDAM)	 2014 
7TH	JOINT	SEMINAR	"THE	FUTURE	OF	LAW	AND	ECONOMICS"			 2015 
Presentations         year 
BOLOGNA	MARCH	SEMINAR		 2014 
HAMBURG	JUNE	SEMINAR		 2014 
ROTTERDAM	FALL	SEMINAR	SERIES		 2014 
ROTTERDAM	WINTER	SEMINAR	SERIES		 2015 
BOLOGNA	NOVEMBER	SEMINAR		 2016 
	
	
	
	
JOINT	SEMINAR	‘THE	FUTURE	OF	LAW	AND	ECONOMICS’		 2016 
Presentations (international) conferences     year 
8TH	JOINT	SEMINAR	"THE	FUTURE	OF	LAW	AND	ECONOMICS",		
ROTTERDAM	
2016 
32ND	EUROPEAN	ASSOCIATION	IN	LAW	AND	ECONOMICS	ANNUAL	
CONFERENCE,	VIENNA	
2015 
2ND	INTERNATIONAL	WORKSHOP	ON	THE	ECONOMIC	ANALYSIS	
OF	LITIGATION,	TURIN	
2015 
ITALIAN	SOCIETY	OF	LAW	AND	ECONOMICS	(ISLE),	10TH	ANNUAL	
CONFERENCE,	ROME	
2014 
Teaching          year 
MONETARY	AND	FINANCIAL	MARKETS	ECONOMICS,	UNIVERSITY	
OF	BOLOGNA			
2015 
INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	ECONOMICS,	UNIVERSITY	OF	BOLOGNA		 2016 
ENTERPRISE	ECONOMICS	AND	CORPORATE	GOVERNANCE,	
UNIVERSITY	OF	BOLOGNA				
2016 
THE	ECONOMIC	ANALYSIS	OF	LAW,	UNIVERSITY	OF	BOLOGNA					 2016 
THE	ECONOMIC	ANALYSIS	OF	CONTRACTS,	UNIVERSITY	OF	
BOLOGNA				
2016 
GAME	THEORY,	UNIVERSITY	OF	BOLOGNA			 2016 
MICROECONOMICS,		JOHNS	HOPKINS	UNIVERSITY,	SAIS	CENTER			 2016 
Others          year 
MARKET	ANALYST	(MARKET	INTELLIGENCE),	BOLOGNA		 2016-now 
 
 
	
	
